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Court delay is one of most serious problems faced by judicial systems around the world. This 
work explores the problem through four complementary essays. The first one analyzes court 
disposition time combining different but interrelated theoretical perspectives: institutional, 
organizational, agent-principal and game theory. The second essay examines if court delay in 
Brazil is a real problem or just a matter of biased perception of court users. The conclusion is 
that the duration of civil cases in Brazilian first instance courts is almost three times higher 
than in Europe. However, as the number of resolved cases is higher than the number of 
incoming cases, case backlog and court disposition time have a decreasing tendency. The 
third essay investigates which factors affect court disposition time in Brazil. The data was 
collected from 15 in-depth interviews with judges, prosecutors and lawyers. Content analysis 
generated a list of 28 factors that were clustered in three basic dimensions: institutional, 
jurisdictional and organizational. This essay concludes that institutional factors form two 
opposite phenomena named “judicial universalism” and “judicial aversion”, which have a 
major and negative impact on court speed. Although smaller, jurisdictional factors also seem 
to have a negative impact on celerity. Surprisingly, most organizational factors seem to have 
a positive impact on the pace of cases. The last essay undertakes an empirical investigation 
about factors affecting the number of resolved cases in Brazilian labor courts, distinguishing 
between factors affecting judicial deliberation and judicial enforcement. Contrary to previous 
empirical research, this study found that number of judges have a substantial impact on court 
output and that the number of new cases brought to courts seems to have just a moderate 
effect on the number of resolved cases. The conclusion debates the idea that Brazilian judicial 
system appears to be a long and congested road where cases run around in circles. 
Keywords: court delay, case duration, judicialization, procedural distance, court speed 
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Court delay is one of the most serious and persistent problems faced by judicial 
systems around the world. The fight against the delay in the resolution of judicial disputes 
comes from Antiquity (6th century), when Justinian approved laws with the purpose of 
reducing case duration (Roque, 2016). The right to reasonable duration of courts proceedings 
was formally prescribed by the Magna Carta of 1215, which establishes that no one will be 
denied or delayed the right to justice. In the 20th century, international acts such as the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights 
established the right to a trial within a reasonable time. In Brazil, the reasonable duration of 
courts proceedings was introduced in the Constitution in 2004. 
What constitutes a reasonable time for a judicial proceeding is an open question. On 
the one hand, court speed finds limits in due process, the correct legal procedures that should 
be followed in order to protect someone’s legal rights. On the other hand, excessive delay 
undermines the accuracy and effectiveness of the judgement. The passage of time affects the 
evidence to be collected, the witnesses to be heard and the memory of the facts to be 
discussed (Heise, 2000). Delayed jurisdictional protection cannot be considered fair or 
adequate, after all, the passage of time prevents the parties from having an outcome to their 
litigation. Unnecessary delay in the resolution of cases may cause psychological harm to 
plaintiffs and defendants, both in criminal and non-criminal cases (Shuman, 2000). 
A judicial system capable of resolving cases quickly and fairly is crucial for social and 
economic development. Long proceedings increase litigation costs, inhibits access to Justice 
(Buscaglia & Dakolias, 1999) and affects those who have fewer resources to support trial 
expenses (Galanter, 1974). Delays in resolving court cases undermine public confidence in 
the judicial system and disappoint those seeking compensation through legal proceedings 
(Heise, 2000). The problem is so serious that state responsibility for delaying the resolution 
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of judicial cases have been debated. Italy, for example, approved a law in 2001 (Pinto Law) 
providing financial compensation for damages resulting from a judicial decision taken in 
unreasonable time (Cammnitiello et al., 2017). 
Besides being a social problem, court delay is also an economic problem. Judicial 
delay increases economic transactional costs, which reduces activity and retards economic 
development (Buscaglia & Ulen, 1997). A good judicial system is essential for allowing 
specific investments in physical and human capital (Castelar, 2009). In addition to the 
investment, the delay in resolving legal cases also affects the credit market. Slow lawsuits 
induce the opportunistic behavior of borrowers and the response of creditors may be reducing 
credit availability or increasing interest rates (Chemin, 2010). Judicial slowness also has a 
negative impact on price and speed of public works (Coviello et al., 2013). Economic 
consequences of judicial efficiency have become so important that global institutions such as 
the International Monetary Fund and the European Commission have payed considerable 
attention to that (Di Vita, 2011). 
The long duration of cases is a worldwide problem. This problem occurs in Latin 
America (Buscaglia & Ulen, 1997) and in parts of Europe (Bielen et al., 2015), as well as in 
Asian and African countries, such as China (Jiang, 2005), India (Hazra & Micevska, 2004; 
Chemin, 2010), Nepal (Grajzl & Silwal, 2020) and Senegal (Kondylis & Stein, 2018). Given 
the importance of judicial services for social peace and economic development, judicial 
reforms have been introduced, however most countries have not succeeded in significantly 
reducing court delay (Bielen, et al., 2018). In India, attempts to solve the problem of court 
congestion have produced half-hearted results (Hazra & Micevska, 2004). The USA judicial 
system has undergone successive reforms since the 1950s (Priest, 1989). In 1990, the Civil 
Justice Reform Act (CJRA) was approved with the objective of speeding up civil proceedings 
in progress in the country. A rigorous study about this reform concluded that there was 
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progress in the management of cases, but without a direct impact on the time of judgment 
(Heise, 2000). 
Given the intricate nature of judicial systems, it seems evident the need to consider a 
set of indicators in the analysis of the duration of cases (Cammnitiello et al., 2017). Models 
indicating the factors to predict the time of a court decision can help those who want to 
reduce both the time and costs associated with litigation (Dalton & Singer, 2009). Reforms 
based on guesswork can represent a waste of resources and lead to counter-productive results. 
The reversal of this situation involves conducting studies on the topic, considering that the 
construction of scientific knowledge can generate contributions for improvements in public 
policies and in practices of the administration of Justice. 
The factors impacting the duration of cases are multiple and can be analyzed from 
different perspectives. The duration of cases is associated with the entire legal system. The 
complexity of the legal system, measured by the number of existing laws, may contribute to 
the excessive duration of civil disputes (Di Vita, 2010). The expected duration is 
systematically higher in countries with more formalized proceedings, as civil law countries 
(Djankov, 2003). Ambiguities in the civil procedure code also lengthens trial duration 
(Chemin, 2009). Access to court may have an impact on case duration. It seems that there is a 
tradeoff between the two—more access to justice will probably increase case disposition 
time, all else equal. In fact, empirical evidence suggest that higher caseload leads to higher 
levels of court congestion (Murrel, 2001). 
The duration of cases is one dimension of court performance (Gomes & Guimaraes, 
2013). Court performance has increasingly become the subject of empirical scrutiny. A wide 
range of judicial outcomes have been examined, as the number of judicial decisions (e.g., 
Beenstock & Haitovsky 2004; Rosales-López, 2008; Dimitrova Grajzl et al., 2012; 
Bełdowski et al., 2020), judicial productivity (e.g., Schneider, 2005; Dimitrova Grajzl et. al., 
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2015; Gomes et al., 2016; Gomes et al., 2017), and case disposition time (e.g., Luskin & 
Luskin, 1986; Mitsopoulos & Pelagidis, 2007; Di Vita, 2011; Bielen et. al., 2016). However, 
factors impacting the duration of judicial cases remains unclear and more research on that 
subject is “urgently necessarily” (Berlemann & Christmann, 2020, p. 2). 
Brazil seems to be an appropriate place to investigate factors affecting court 
disposition time. Court delay has been the most frequent complaint made to Brazilian 
National Council of Justice (CNJ), representing alone 68% of the complains made to the 
council in 2018 (CNJ, 2019). It is the dimension that most affects trust in Brazilian courts. In 
a research about trust in the Brazilian Judicial System, 81% of respondents stated that courts 
are slow or very slow (Fundação Getúlio Vargas [FGV], 2017). Judicial slowness is the first 
reason why people avoiding sue (Associação dos Magistrados Brasileiros [AMB], 2019). The 
question of the drivers of court case duration has therefore featured a prominent place in 
Brazilian policy discussions. 
As each country has its own legal environment, factors affecting case disposition time 
may vary from one country to the other. Many studies about case duration have been 
published in Brazil, but they are usually produced in the field of Law, by legal scholars and 
have a theoretical perspective around the concept of reasonable duration of cases (e.g., 
Arruda, 2006; Hoffman, 2006; Belo, 2010; Roque, 2016). A non-legal—but still theoretical— 
study built an econometric model to analyze the relation between gratuity of court fees and 
court congestion (Arake & Gico Jr. 2014).  
Two non-theoretical studies investigating the factors that impact case disposition time 
in Brazil should be mentioned. An empirical research investigated the impact of information 
technology on the time of judgment and found no significant difference between the duration 
of physical and electronic cases (Procopiuck, 2018); Aragão (1996) carried out a research 
supported by interviews to investigate factors impacting the duration of cases in the Labor 
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Court of the state of Espirito Santo. This later study, however, was carried out before 
important institutional changes in the judicial system, as the creation of the National Council 
of Justice in 2004 and is limited in the space (just one state) and area of law (just labor cases). 
As a consequence, there is a lack of knowledge about the real causes of court delay in Brazil 
(Roque, 2016). In other to fill in this gap, the objective of this research is investigating which 
factors affect court disposition time in Brazil. To comply with this objective, four studies 
were undertaken. Each study is a chapter of this dissertation, as described in Table 1.1: 
Table 1.1 
Classification of Studies Composing the Research 
Chapter 2 3 4 5 
Method Theoretical Empirical Empirical Empirical 
Approach Qualitative Quantitative Qualitative Quantitative 
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Chapter two debates the phenomena of court disposition time blending four 
theoretical perspectives. The institutional perspective demonstrates how formal and informal 
legal rules frame the performance of courts and set the ground in which legal actors play. The 
organizational perspective debates the idea of courts as professional organizations and 
discusses case disposition time as one dimension of judicial performance. It is shown how 
celerity is a consequence of the operation of the entire judicial system, being impacted by 
several factors, from the rules governing access to courts to the quality of judicial decisions. 
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The agent-principal perspective contributes to the comprehension of individual behavior in 
the judicial arena, showing that judges and lawyers may have their own interests in litigation, 
which may affect court disposition time. Finally, game-theory is applied to analyze the 
strategic behavior of litigants, revealing that when parties make litigation decisions (settle, 
sue, appeal, etc.) they take into consideration the expected behavior of the other side. 
Chapter three investigates if the general opinion about court delay in Brazil is really a 
fact or just a biased perception of court users. This study uses international standards to 
measure court disposition time in Brazil, which allows for a comparison with European 
countries. The comparison is focused on civil cases and distinguishes between the situation in 
the first and second instances. Methodological cautions taken to achieve the highest possible 
comparability are explained in detail. Besides measuring court disposition time, this chapter 
also displays performance indicators showing the tendency of court disposition time in Brazil 
for the next years. 
Chapter four explores which are the possible factors affecting the duration of civil 
cases in Brazil. To achieve a comprehensive view of those factors, 15 key actors among 
judges, prosecutors and lawyers were interviewed. The 28 factors reported by interviewees 
were clustered in three dimensions: institutional, jurisdictional, and organizational. It should 
be noted that those dimensions have close relation to the theoretical perspectives analyzed in 
Chapter 2. The factors are discussed vis-à-vis with the current knowledge about court 
performance found in the international literature.  
Chapter five conducts an inferential analysis about factors impacting the number of 
resolved cases in judgement and enforcement stages of judicial proceedings. Courts would 
have little social value if the judicial decisions could not be enforced. In fact, court users 
expected not just a judicial decision, but the effective repair for the violation of their rights. 
The researched is focused on Brazilian labor courts and combines two regression methods 
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(pooled Ordinary Least Squares and two-way Fixed Effects) to investigate which factors 
affect judgements and enforcements. The results are compared to analogous empirical 
research conducted in other countries. 
The main thesis of this doctoral dissertation is that case disposition time is long 
because the procedural journey is long. Long journeys and short times are incompatible. This 
is a law of physics. Time is equal to distance upon speed. If the distance of the procedural 
journey is too long, cases will take too much time to be resolved even if judicial proceedings 
are fast. As the number of procedures, appeals and instances in Brazil seems to be excessive, 





2 Court Disposition Time. Building a Multidisciplinary Theoretical Framework 
Abstract 
The factors that impact the duration of cases are multiple and can be analyzed from different 
perspectives. This study analyzes the problem combining four different but interrelated 
theoretical perspectives: institutional, organizational, agent-principal, and game theory. Each 
theory is useful to understands certain aspects of court disposition time. The general 
conclusion of this study is that the phenomena is complex and could be analyzed under a 
multidisciplinary theoretical approach. This approach encompasses a kind of a theoretical 
mosaic in which each part influences the behavior of the whole recursively. 
Keywords: institution, organization, agent-principal, game theory 
2.1 Introduction 
The duration of judicial cases is a complex phenomenon, associated with the 
performance of the entire judicial system. This paper makes a theoretical debate of the 
phenomenon adopting four different and interrelated theoretical perspectives: institutional, 
organizational, agent-principal and game theory perspectives. Those perspectives are strongly 
interrelated and there is no clear cut between them. The concept of ‘institution’ is versatile, 
multidimensional and has been used in several disciplines including law, political science, 
sociology and economics, with different connotations and meanings (Engelbreckt, 2010, p. 
299). According to that author, some institutionalists treat organizations as institutions and 
include in the definition of institutions not only social norms and culturally stabilized systems 
but also social entities that are capable of purposive action. 
In the field of Administration of Justice, the distinction between institution and 
organization is even harder. Courts are so institutionalized and legitimated, in the sense that 
their existence and functioning are taken for granted and, in this sense, analysis of the judicial 
system often overlap the terms institution and organization (Guimaraes et al., 2018). This 
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study will distinguish between both terms, in order to enable a clear understanding of the 
dimensions impacting court disposition time. 
Regarding to the concept of institution, this work will be based on the definition 
offered by Douglas North, who describes institutions as formal rules, informal constraints and 
the enforcement characteristics of both (North, 1993). Social, political, and economic 
institutions have become larger, more complex and resourceful, and more important to 
society. Institutions of law occupy a dominant role in contemporary life, being political actors 
in their own right (March & Olsen, 1984). The first step to understand the duration of judicial 
cases is to analyze how legal institutions impact the flow of judicial proceedings. 
If institutions are the rules of the game, organizations are the players and can be 
defined as “groups of individuals engaged in purposive activity” (North, 1993, p. 3). Courts 
are the central organizations of any justice system. Low-income households and small 
businesses often cannot afford the relatively high costs involved in using alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) mechanisms, such as mediation or arbitration (Buscaglia & Ulen, 1997). In 
some countries these mechanisms do not even exist (Bielen et al., 2018). Broadly speaking, 
private alternatives play a residual role in the resolution of conflicts (Djankov et al., 2003; 
Ippoliti et al., 2015). 
Courts are the main organizations of dispute settlement in modern societies. 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to understand court disposition time from an organizational 
perspective. Judges are the professionals at the center of courts (Fix-Fierro, 2003; Guimaraes 
et. al., 2011). The individual behavior of those professionals may have a substantive impact 
on the duration of cases. However, due to the necessity to assure judicial independence, 
judges are not subjected to the traditional organizational incentives. To analyze the incentives 




Finally, game theory is used to investigate why Repeated Players, acting as litigants, 
avoid to settlement and prefer to leave people bringing cases to courts. Game Theory assumes 
that decision-makers are rational and strategic (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994). It seems to be 
an appropriate approach to investigate litigation because litigants usually take decisions based 
on logic—they are rational—and consider other litigant expected behavior—they are 
strategic. 
Following this line, this article aims to build a multidisciplinary theoretical framework 
for the phenomenon of court disposition time. This debate aims to offer an integrative 
perspective and, in this sense, to contribute to future research on this topic. 
2.2 Institutional Perspective 
Understanding the duration of judicial cases requires an analysis of the institutions 
that form the legal environment of a certain society. Institutions are formal rules, informal 
constraints and the enforcement characteristics of both (North, 1993). Institutionalization 
involves the processes by which social norms and obligations reach a rule-like status in social 
thought and action (Meyer & Rowan,1977). They are humanly devised constraints to social 
and economic behavior that appear in the form of routines, rules and customs which frame 
human conduct and help reduce uncertainty (Engelbreckt, 2010). 
Probably, the main institution in any legal system is its legal tradition. The West has 
two major legal traditions: common law and civil law. In common law countries, case law—
published judicial decision—is of primary importance, whereas in civil law systems, codified 
statutes predominate (Tetley, 2000). A common law system is based on the concept of 
judicial precedent. Judges take an active role in shaping the law, because judicial decisions 
are used as a precedent for future cases. Judges rely on precedents set by previous courts 
decisions to interpret laws and apply them to individual cases. Civil law systems, on the other 
hand, rely on written statutes and other legal codes that establish legal procedures and 
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punishments. In a civil law system, a judge merely establishes the facts of a case and applies 
remedies found in the codified law. 
Legal tradition has a significant influence on the central features of the judicial 
system, such as the role of judges and attorneys; the basic characteristics of procedure; the 
nature of appeal; the legal force of judgments and precedents (Fix Fierro, 2003). All these 
elements impact the duration of cases. Being a civil law country, for example, has a 
significant impact on formalism and the expected duration of cases is systematically higher in 
countries with more formalized proceedings (Djankov et. al., 2003). The formalistic civil law 
tradition may be one structural explanation for the duration of cases in countries that adopt 
this legal perspective. 
Nevertheless, civil law countries can also adopt the legal force of precedents, 
especially those stablished by upper courts, aiming to decrease case duration. A Brazilian 
constitutional reform approved in 2004, for instance, represented a watershed toward this 
direction, creating a “biding precedent” that can be approved by the Brazilian Supreme Court 
and has mandatory force over all courts in the country.  
Another basic legal institution in any country is the law. Laws are the rules approved 
by legislative bodies, including the constitution, codes, statutes, and specific laws. They are 
the highest degree of a legal institution due to their formalism, mandatory, and enforceable by 
definition. Access to courts, hearings, procedures, judgements, juries, and appeals are defined 
by the law. 
Laws define access to courts in many ways. The first one is creating incentives to the 
parties to resolves their disputes privately. Laws may stimulate parties to share information 
with each other, reducing the divergent expectation about the future judgement and fostering 
private settlements before the lawsuit (Spier, 2005), may define that litigation costs will be 
paid by the loser party, discouraging low-probability-of-prevailing plaintiffs (Bar-Gill, 2005), 
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and may defining the level of court fees to be paid by litigants. Laws define strict guidelines 
for judicial proceedings and, as a consequence, are decisive to the pace of case in courts. 
Procedural rules lie in the center of judicial organization and are so important that court 
apparatus has articulated itself around the adjudicative process (Fix-Fierro, 2003). The legal 
process cannot be shortened by a creative judge that had as innovative idea about a new 
procedure. In fact, a judicial decision is legitimate only if it follows the rules of the legal 
process. As a consequence, to understand the duration of cases in a country, it is also 
necessary to understand the laws that drive the legal process of that country.  
The legal process in Brazil, for instance, has an Italian origin. Most of the procedural 
aspects of Brazilian legal system seem to be a consequence of the Italian Civil procedural 
code imported to Brazil many decades ago. This phenomenon can be considered a typical 
example of path dependence, a historical institutional mechanism demonstrating that 
institutional choice is contingent on a historical context that has been shaped through time 
and is generally resistant to change (Hall & Taylor, 1996). 
Formal rules are not necessarily created to be socially efficient; rather they are created 
to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power (North, 1990). This is particularly so 
for institutions which are a product of the political process, typically legal rules resulting 
from legislative processes (Engelbreckt, 2010). 
Another institution that builds the legal environment is the legal profession. The bar is 
the legal profession as an institution. The term represents the line (or "bar") that separates the 
parts of a courtroom reserved for spectators and the lawyers participating in a trial. The 
number, behavior and structure of payment of lawyers may have an important influence on 
litigation. An association between the number of lawyers and the level of litigation was 




2.3 Organizational Perspective 
In Max Weber's classic concept, organizations are rational means designed to achieve 
optimal results with minimal effort. The highest rational type of organization is bureaucracy, 
because of its formal and regulated application of specialized professional knowledge 
(Weber, 1984). A special kind of organization, the so-called professional bureaucracy 
includes organizations that hire highly trained specialists—called professionals—and then 
give them considerable autonomy so that they work relatively free not only from the 
administrative hierarchy but also from their colleagues (Mintzberg, 1980). 
Courts constitute “professional bureaucracies” and judges are the professionals at the 
center of these organizations (Fix-Fierro, 2003; Guimaraes et. al., 2011). In professional 
bureaucracies, professionals control their own work and tend to maintain collective control of 
the organization's administrative apparatus (Mintzberg, 1980). Much of the formal and 
informal power of a professional bureaucracy rests on its operational core, clearly its 
fundamental part (Mintzberg, 1980). In the courts, the operational core, made up of judges 
and their direct support team, form the most important part of the organization. 
The organizational lens frames courts as professional bureaucracies and helps to better 
understand the dynamics of their functioning. As organizations, courts may have their 
performance measured and evaluated. According to Gomes and Guimaraes (2013) judicial 
performance is a multidimensional concept that involves objective and subjective elements, 
internal and external to the Judiciary. The authors suggest the following dimensions of 
judicial performance: quality (subjective and internal), effectiveness (subjective and 
external), access and independence (objective and external), and efficiency and celerity 
(objective and internal). Besides being a dimension of court performance on its own, celerity 
may reflect variations in quality, access and efficiency of courts. 
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Broadly speaking, case duration is directly related to the quantity of judicial decisions. 
Ceteris paribus, the higher the number of judicial decisions, the lower the court disposition 
time. There is a long debate around the tradeoff between quantity and quality of judicial 
decisions. Aiming to reduce case disposition time, judges may increase the quantity of 
decisions, with adverse consequences to their quality. Empirical evidence about this point is 
mixed. While some studies point that an increase in the quantity of judicial decisions may 
affect the quality other studies did not detect this tradeoff. 
A negative relationship between quantity and quality was detected in the United 
States, both in federal courts of appeals and the in Supreme Court. (Epstein et al., 2010). For 
these authors, collegiate bodies face the problem of “dissent aversion”, i.e., diverging from 
colleagues has a cost, both in terms of effort and relationships. In the two instances 
investigated, empirical evidence demonstrates that a higher workload is associated with a 
lower divergence rate between the judges. Another survey showed a negative association 
between workload and quality (Huang, 2011). In 2002, a wave of lawsuits from the United 
States immigration department flooded two federal courts of appeal. The other federal courts 
of appeal were not affected. The two flooded courts began to reverse civil decisions from the 
lower court less frequently, while the reversals of the other courts remained the same.  
A study in Slovenia found divergent results (Dimitrova-Grajzl et. al., 2012). Using 
data on appealed and overturned cases as proxies for quality of judicial decision-making, the 
study found that more productive judges make lower-quality decisions in local courts, but not 
in district courts. Some studies had found no relation between quantity and quality of judicial 
decisions. A study carried out in Spain collected data of civil courts in a specific region of the 
country, in an attempt to compare similar units (Rosales-López, 2008). The result shows a 
lack of relationship between the volume of decisions in each unit and its reversal rate, which 
would be an indication that the volume has no relation to the quality of decisions. This was 
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the same conclusion as a study conducted in Nepal, which found no empirical evidence that 
an increase in the volume of decisions would decrease the quality of judicial decisions (Grajzl 
& Silwal, 2020). 
Access to Justice may have a direct impact on court cased case duration. If the number 
of new filed cases is too high, courts may not be able to keep up with judicial demand, case 
backlog will rise, and court disposition time will increase. Gratuity of court fees may be is a 
possible solution to grant court access for those who may be unable to pay for it, however, if 
indistinctively granted, it may lead to frivolous litigation, court congestion and court delay 
(Arake & Gico Jr., 2014; Gico Jr., 2014). 
Efficiency of courts may or may not have an impact on case disposition time. 
Efficiency shows a relation between inputs and products. Efficiency improves when fewer 
inputs are used for the same number of products or when more products are made with the 
same inputs. Court efficiency is a relation between the number of judicial decisions (outputs) 
and the number of organizational resources—judges, servants, budget, etc. (Voigt, 2016). If 
court efficiency improves due to an increase in the number of decisions, court disposition 
time will decrease. However, if court efficiency improves just because the court is using 
fewer inputs, court disposition time will not be affected. 
The organizational perspective also collaborates in the understanding of isomorphism 
among courts. Coercive isomorphism is a mechanism through which one organization exerts 
formal and informal pressure on other organizations leading them to become increasingly 
similar (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). National Councils of Justice seem to play this role in the 
judicial system. Since 1946, more than 100 countries have created judicial councils, most of 
them in the Constitution (Garoupa & Ginsburg 2009). One of the functions performed by 
Councils of Justice is contributing to the professionalization and the “de-bureaucratization” 
of the courts (Fix-Fierro, 2003). 
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2.4 Principal-Agent Perspective 
A traditional strict hierarchical organization perspective is not enough to analyze 
judicial behavior. Due to the necessity to assure judicial independence to judge, devices such 
as life tenure and wage irreducibility were created. However, the effort to insulate judges 
from significant economic incentives has not rendered judicial behavior immune to economic 
analysis, because judges are rational and pursue instrumental and consumption goals of the 
same general kind that private persons do (Posner, 1993). Besides the salary (and other 
financial earnings), values like reputation, prestige and reversal avoidance are also important 
to judges (Posner, 1993). When those values are affected, judicial behavior may be affected 
as well.  
A broader framework to debate economic incentives in the justice system may be 
required and a possible alternative can be the Agency Theory, which treats judges as agents 
(Maskin & Tirole, 2004). An agency relationship can be defined as a contract under which 
one person (the principal) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their 
behalf, which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Economic relationships in which one party (the principal) wishes to affect 
the actions of another (the agent) by means of incentives are ubiquitous (Dixit, 2002).  
Agency models warn that agents, unless properly selected, monitored, and rewarded, 
will not act in the interests of principals (Choi, 2007). The principal can limit divergences 
from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring 
monitoring costs designed to limit the deviant activities of the agent (Jensen, 1976). If there 
were several agents performing similar tasks and subject to common risks, then each agent 
performance can be compared with that of the other to get a better estimate of his effort or 
skills that were not directly observable (Dixit, 1998).  
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As judicial cases are often assigned to judges on a random basis, the performance of 
judges can be compared. If judges are the agents, who may act as “principal”? This role may 
be performed by Judicial Councils. Judicial Councils in several European countries (France, 
Spain, Italy, and Portugal) participates, to a greater or lesser extent, in the selection, 
appointment and advancement of judges, as well as in judicial discipline (Fix-Fierro, 2003). 
They act as an instance of the governance of court performance and judicial behavior.  
Agents acquire specialized information, and they can vary the quality and the quantity 
of their efforts in ways that are largely unobserved by outsiders (Dixit, 1998). The 
multitasking model (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991) shows that if an agent is given two 
objectives, and only one of those objectives can be measured and monitored by the principal, 
then the agent will shirk on the hard-to-measure objective and invest in achieving the other 
(Choi, 2007).  
This scenario may happen in the judicial system. Courts can define quantitative 
targets around productivity. Monitoring the number of decisions per judges is important and 
easy. Nonetheless, in order to comply with this performance indicator, judges may be 
tempted to devote attention just to easier cases and hold back the complex ones. Acting this 
way, they would comply with raw judicial productivity targets, but will leave many litigants 
without a jurisdictional response for their disputes. Evidence of this behavior was identified 
in India (Hazra & Micevska, 2004), where courts are able to deal with current caseload, but 
are not efficient in addressing the real backlogs of cases pending for more than a year. The 
agent-principal theory seems to be a plausible explanation for judicial procrastination, for 
instance, when some judges avoid deciding complex cases, because those cases are time-
consuming. 
The quality of judicial decisions is other important aspect to be analyzed that is hard 
to measure and may be neglected. One possibility here is measuring the reversal rate of 
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judges. According to Posner (1993, p. 14), “judges don’t like to be reversed”. If a judge has a 
higher reversal rate than other comparable judges, this may hurt his judicial reputation. 
Judges might concern themselves with their long-term reputation among judicial colleagues 
and lawyers (Choi, 2007). 
The agent-principal perspective may also be applied to understand the behavior of 
lawyers. Lawyers represent their clients in courts, so they are agents of litigants. As agents, 
lawyers have their own economic interests, which may be different of the interest of their 
clients. Lawyer may act to maximize their incomes at the expense of their clients, prolonging 
litigation and increasing legal fees (Gilson & Mnookin, 1994). To the degree that clients 
cannot observe lawyers’ efforts and lack legal expertise, a fee arrangement linked to lawyers’ 
performance may be convenient for clients and lawyers (Kaplow & Shavell, 2002). If lawyers 
are compensated at an hourly rate for time spent, without regard to legal outcomes, the 
economic incentive of the lawyer would be extending the duration of cases. 
2.5 Game Theory Perspective 
Game theory is a framework designed to help the understanding of decisions taken 
when decision-makers interact (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994). From this interaction emerges 
a strategic behavior, when one person considers how a second person will behave in making a 
decision, and the second person does the same (Picker, 1994). The theory investigates how 
players should conduct themselves when each realizes that the consequences of his acts will 
depend in on what other players will do. 
Game theory has cultivated significant advances not only in economics, but also in 
other branches of social science fields, as accounting, finance, marketing, political science 
sociology, and eventually, law (Gibbons, 1997). Game-theoretic methods to study legal 
problems dates at least to the early 1970s and has being growing ever since (Salam & 
Theodore, 1996). Game Theory seems to be especially useful to analyze litigation. The two 
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basic and imperative assumptions that underlie Game Theory are that decision-makers are 
rational and strategic (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994). Those engaged in litigation—the 
litigants, their attorneys, and other interested parties—are rational and strategic (Spier, 2005). 
They are rational because their decisions are based on logic and they are strategic because 
they take into account other litigant expected behavior (e.g., if the other side will settle or not, 
sue or not, appeal or not). 
The scientific literature upon litigation can be divided into three generations (Huang 
& Wu, 1992). The first generation used single-person decision theory to describe rational 
choices by potential litigants (e.g., Landes, 1971; Gould, 1973; Posner, 1973). The second 
generation explicitly considered the strategic interaction of multiple decision-makers but 
modeled just games of complete information, when information knowledge about other 
players is available to all participants (e.g., Hause, 1989). The third and most sophisticated 
generation of litigation studies considered games of incomplete information, postulating 
asymmetric information as the reason for differing beliefs over the result of a trial (e.g., P’ng, 
1983; Reiganum & Wilde, 1986). 
This theoretic perspective could be applied to analyze the behavior of one specific 
kind of litigant: the Repeated Player. While One-Shotters are those claimants who have only 
occasional recourse to the courts, Repeat Players engage in many similar litigations over time 
(Galanter, 1974). Spouses in a divorce or people involved in a car accident are examples of 
One-Shotters. Banks, telephone companies and government are examples of Repeated 
players. Typically, the Repeat Player is a larger unit and the One-Shotter is a smaller unit. 
Repeated Players play Repeated Games. Repeated games models are designed to 
examine the logic of long-term interaction, capturing the idea that a Repeated Player will take 
into account the effect of his current behavior on the other players' future behavior (Osborne 
& Rubinstein, 1994, p. 133). Unlike in a classical game situation, which is essentially a one-
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shot affair, a conflict situation usually leads to another conflict situation. Thus, in real life, 
when one takes action one should consider not only the immediate payoffs but also the effect 
that the actions may have on the other conflict situations that will occur in the future 
(Aumann et al., 1995). 
Why out-of-the-court settlement is not the rational solution for the Repeated Player in 
the long run? Because he has learned that most Plaintiffs will not bring their cases to court. 
Besides monetary expenses, the plaintiff’s litigation cost would typically include the 
plaintiff's personal cost of effort, time, and any other opportunity costs associated with his 
involvement in the lawsuit (Spier, 2005). One-Shotters’ claims may be so small that the cost 
of judicialization surpasses any promise benefit (Galanter, 1974). Repeated Players—
especially those with skilled lawyers—learn about the strategies that their opponents employ. 
Even if One-Shotters threat that they will sue, Repeated Players know they usually will not, 
so this the threat to sue is not a credible treat. In the long run, paying the judgement of few 
suits is better than paying all out-of-the-court settlement proposals. 
Despite the incentives for litigation and the high number of cases indeed brought to 
courts, litigation still represents an economic advantage for Repeated Players. It is a matter of 
fact that some Plaintiffs will fail to sue because of the costs of litigation. Therefore, cases 
filed against Repeated Players are not enough to produce a deterrent effect. In this scenario, 
how to stimulate Repeated Players to settle instead of litigating? Depending on the country, 
one possible alternative would be replacing the system of compensatory damages for the 
system of punitive damages. 
In the system of compensatory damages, the plaintiff’s award is exactly equal to her 
damages. Compensatory damages are intended simply to pay the person who was injured and 
not to punish the person for their wrongdoing. The monetary award paid to plaintiff can 
include material and moral losses. Punitive damages are paid by a defendant found guilty of 
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committing an offense on top of compensatory damages. They are awarded by a court of law 
not to compensate injured plaintiffs but to punish defendants whose conduct is considered 
grossly negligent or intentional. Punitive damages are designed to punish the defendant for 
outrageous conduct and/or to reform or deter the defendant and others from engaging in 
similar conduct. Failure to impose punitive damages would result in inadequate deterrence 
(Polinsky & Shavell, 1998).  
However, the adoption of punitive damages may cause other problem. If it is assumed 
that any judgment against a defendant is automatically awarded to the plaintiff, the award of 
punitive damage will increase the number of suits, at least at the first moment plaintiffs will 
be stimulated to sue, in order to earn punitive damages. It is expected that Repeated Players 
would learn that wrongdoing does not compensate anymore and will avoid engaging in those 
actions, which would reduce the number of lawsuits in the second moment. Nonetheless, it is 
weird arguing that in order to decrease the number of cases brought to courts it is necessary 
to firstly increase the number of cases brought to courts.  
To surpass this puzzle, decoupling seems to be a reasonable solution. Decoupling 
means that judgment against a defendant is not automatically awarded to the plaintiff. The 
optimal decoupled scheme makes the plaintiff's award very small so that only a handful of 
cases are brought, and, at the same time, it makes the defendant's liability very large so that 
his expected future liability equals the social harm that his actions cause (Spier, 2005). 
Decoupling creates a strong incentive for settlement because it creates a wedge between the 
most that the defendant is willing to pay and the least that the plaintiff is willing to accept. In 
other words, decoupling creates incentives for the emergence of a bargaining zone. 





This study blends four different theoretical approaches to analyze court disposition 
time: institutional, organizational, agent-principal and game theory. As courts are very 
institutionalized organizations, it is not simple to distinguish between institutions and 
organizations in the field of administration of Justice. However, as demonstrated in the 
sections above, this distinction is possible and contribute to identify which dimension is 
impacting the duration of cases. Sometimes, the same problem may be a consequence of 
factors located in different dimensions. The excess of procedural acts, for example, may be a 
consequence of legal rules approved by legislative bodies —institutional perspective—or 
may be a consequence of procedural regulations issued by the court deciding the case—
organizational perspective (Fix-Fierro, 2003). 
The institutional perspective was used to analyzes some important institutions in any 
legal system, as the legal tradition, the laws and the bar that are present. The organizational 
theory debated how court disposition time may reflect the performance of multiple aspects of 
the judicial system, as the quality of decision, the access to Justice or judicial efficiency. It 
also helps to understand that organizational process as isomorphism may occur within the 
judicial system. The individual behavior of judges was analyzed using the agent-principal 
perspective and, finally, the behavior of Repeated Players was scrutinized from the game 
theory perspective. 
Actually, the combination of different theoretical lenses allows a deeper analysis of 
the phenomena. However, court disposition time is so complex that other theories may be 





3. Court Disposition Time in Brazil and in European Countries1 
Abstract 
The length of judicial proceedings is a subject on the agenda of social researchers, policy 
makers, politicians, legal practitioners, and administrators of justice in different countries. If 
court disposition time in specific countries should be considered reasonable or delayed 
remains an open question. Brazilian courts are perceived as slow. This study investigates if 
court delay is a real problem or just a biased perception. The duration of civil cases in Brazil 
is measured with international standards and compared to the duration in European courts. 
Disposition time in Brazilian first instance courts is three times higher than the European 
average. In Brazilian second instance courts, disposition time is 50% higher than in Europe. 
However, the number of decided cases in those courts is higher than the number of new 
incoming cases, which means that the backlog and the disposition time in Brazilian courts 
have a decreasing tendency. These data are discussed, managerial recommendations and a 
research agenda are stated. 
Keywords: court delay, case duration, civil cases, disposition time, clearance rate 
3.1 Introduction 
Court delay seems to be a problem in Brazil. There is a perception among citizens that 
judicial services are slow or very slow (FGV, 2017; AMB, 2019; CNJ, 2019). The judicial 
system may be violating the constitutional rule that cases should be decided in a “reasonable 
time”. What constitutes a reasonable time is an open theoretical question, frequently debated 
by law-and-court scholars. However, what constitutes court disposition time is an empirical 
issue that can be measured and compared. In order to investigate if court delay is a real 
problem or just a biased perception, empirical studies could (1) measure court disposition 
time in Brazil and (2) compare the results with other countries. 
                                                          
1 Paper submitted to Direito GV journal. 
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The length of cases can be measured using different methods. Brazilian National 
Council of Justice (CNJ) uses the traditional method of measuring the number of days 
between a starting point (e.g., the day the case was brought to court) and a final point (e.g., 
the day the case was decided). For each case, the number of days is calculated, and court 
disposition time will be a simple mean of all cases decided by that court in the period. For 
example, all cases decided by a court in the year 2018. Some problems arise from this 
method. The first one is that the number of days increases when older cases are decided. If 
some court increases the number of cases decided and start to decide older cases that are in 
the backlog, the length of cases will increase, because older cases, with a longer duration, 
will be considered. As the time measured increases, the perception is that court performance 
deteriorates, when in fact it is just the opposite, i.e., more cases are decided. 
A second problem of this method is that pending cases are not considered in the 
analysis. Sometimes, the number of pending cases is large and excluding then will distort the 
results. To overcome this problem, the CNJ uses a separated measure for the pending cases. 
However, this measure is also biased, because some final date is considered, as all the cases 
would be ended that date, usually the last day of the year. The real length of pending cases is 
much larger, because these cases will still take many days, sometime years, to be ended after 
the cap considered in the analysis. 
Besides being biased, this dual method (one for cases decided and other for pending 
cases) increases the complexity of analysis. This method complicates comparisons of court 
performance over time. If the length of ended cases decreases but the length of pending cases 
increases, it is hard to point if court disposition time is in fact increasing or decreasing. It also 
complicates comparisons between different courts. If court “A” is faster in decided cases and 
court “B” is faster in pending cases, it is hard to say which one is faster. 
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A statistical technic called “survival analysis” seems to be appropriate to analyze the 
duration of cases, because it considers information provided by both decided and pending 
cases in the same analysis (Grajz & Zajc, 2017). The use of survival methods in the field of 
law and economics seems to be increasing and some studies using this technic have been 
published (e.g., Bielen et. al., 2016; Grajz & Zajc, 2017; Procopiuk, 2018). The great 
problem of survival analysis is that it requires case-level data, which is very difficult to 
obtain, especially in the context of international studies comparing different countries. 
The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice uses the “backlog index” 
(also known as Capelletti-Clark index) to assess court disposition time in European countries 
(Commission Européenne Pour L’Efficacité de la Justice—CEPEJ, 2018). This index is 
defined as the number of pending cases at the end of the year divided by the number of 
resolved cases during the year (Clark & Merryman, 1974). It indicates the number of years 
the system would take to resolve all pending cases (backlog) and can be interpreted as the 
average duration of a case in the court (Castro, 2009). Some studies show a parallel between 
this index and the actual procedural times per case and has proven to approximate both the 
median and the mean of actual duration, representing a good measure of central tendency 
(Buscaglia & Dakolias, 1999). Several studies have used the backlog index as a measure of 
case duration (e.g., Murrel, 2001; Chemin, 2009; Castro, 2009). According to the CEPEJ, this 
ratio “allows comparisons within the same jurisdiction over time and, with some prudence, 
between judicial systems in different countries” (CEPEJ, 2018, p. 238). 
In order to monitor if courts are keeping up with the incoming caseload, CNJ and 
CEPEJ monitor the clearance rate, obtained by dividing the number of resolved cases by the 
number of incoming cases, expressed in a percentage (CNJ, 2020; CEPEJ, 2018). A clearance 
rate close to 100% indicates the ability of the court to resolve approximately as many cases as 
the number of incoming cases in the period. A clearance rate above 100% indicates the ability 
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of the court to resolve more cases than those received, thus reducing the number of pending 
cases (reducing the backlog). Finally, a clearance rate below 100% appears when the number 
of incoming cases is higher than the number of resolved cases, which increases the number of 
pending cases. 
The case backlog of a court may be a consequence of several years. While the backlog 
index reflects the consequences of past work for court disposition time in the present, the 
clearance rate demonstrates the tendency of court disposition time for the future, because it 
shows if backlog will increase or decrease. The combination of backlog index and clearance 
rate reveals a general picture of the pace of cases in courts. Surprisingly, no study was found 
comparing the backlog index of Brazilian courts to the index of other countries. The 
clearance rate was used in only one cross-country study (Dakolias, 1999), but that research 
considered just two Brazilian cities (São Paulo and Brasília) and was produced a long time 
before the collection of official judicial data by the Brazilian National Council of Justice. 
Due to the lack of studies comparing the duration of cases in Brazil and in other 
countries, it is difficult to conclude if court disposition time in Brazil could be considered 
delayed or not. In order to fill in this gap in the literature, the present study proposes to (1) 
measure court disposition time in Brazil, adopting the backlog index, (2) measure the 
tendency of court disposition time in Brazil, adopting the clearance rate, and (3) compare the 
results with the same performance indicators in European countries. 
3.2 Method and Data 
International comparisons upon the length of judicial proceedings are complex and 
inaccurate, due to differences between countries regarding to judicial organization, economic 
situation, demography and legal characteristics. According to CEPEJ, focusing on civil and 
commercial litigious cases offers a clearer picture for comparative analysis because its 
definition shows lower differences among states (CEPEJ, 2018). The analysis produced by 
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CEPEJ contemplates more than 40 countries with different judicial traditions, including civil 
law countries (e.g., Italy, Spain, Portugal), the same system adopted in Brazil. Considering 
the large number of countries analyzed by CEPEJ and the inclusion of some civil law 
countries, it seems reasonable to compare Brazil to European countries using civil and 
commercial litigious cases. 
The greatest methodological challenges of this study are (1) understanding the criteria 
used by CEPEJ to define “civil and commercial litigious cases” and (2) reproducing these 
criteria in the Brazilian context. Serious flaws in any of those steps would affect the fairness 
of the comparison between Brazilian and European courts. 
The document “Explanatory Note to the Scheme for Evaluating Judicial Systems” 
(CEPEJ, 2017) offers a detailed explanation of all criteria used by European Council. From 
that document is possible to understand that “civil and commercial litigious cases” include 
typical civil cases as divorces or disputes regarding contracts, typical commercial cases as 
bankruptcies, enforcement litigious cases, and employment dismissals (termination of 
employment contract at the initiative of the employer). The category does not include 
criminal cases, administrative cases (disputes between citizens and public authorities) and 
civil non-litigious cases, as business registers and land registers (duties performed by some 
courts in Europe). 
Aiming to reproduce the same criteria described above, the collection of the data in 
Brazil included only cases filed in state and labor courts. Federal, military or electoral courts 
were not included because cases filed in those courts can be considered administrative under 
international standards. All cases in state and labor courts were considered, but criminal and 
tax enforcement cases were excluded. Some administrative cases filed in state courts remain 
in the pool, as cases filed by public servants against the state government or cases filed by 
citizens or companies against tax authorities, which cannot be distinguished from civil cases 
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due to data unavailability. This point should not be considered a serious problem because 
some European countries face the same difficulty, also including some administrative cases 
into the “civil and commercial litigious cases” category, and because those cases should 
represent a small fraction of the whole pool of civil and commercial cases filed in state 
courts. 
Case disposition time in Brazilian courts will be measured using the same formula 
adopted by CEPEJ (2018), obtained by dividing the number of pending cases at the year by 
the number of resolved cases within the same year multiplied by 365 (days in a year): 
 
Court 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = N𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑜𝑓 the year x 365 
           Number of 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 during the year 
 
 Clearance rates in Brazilian courts will be measured using the same formula adopted 
by CEPEJ (2018), obtained by dividing the number of resolved cases by the number of 
incoming cases, expressed in a percentage: 
 
Clearance Rate (%) = R𝑒𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 year x 100 
                   𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎 year 
 
Data was downloaded from the Brazilian National Council of Justice’s website2 and 
considered the year 2019, the last data available. Disposition time and clearance rate of 
European countries were obtained from CEPEJ’s website3, considering the year 2016, the last 
year available. 






3.3 Results and Discussion 
 The final dataset used in the research captures the major part of litigation in Brazil. 
The number of new incoming cases filed in first instance courts (15.295.613), for example, 
represents 63% of all new cases filed in Brazilian courts at that level.  
In Brazil, cases filed in state courts may follow the common procedure or the special 
procedure (designed to small claims). Cases in labor courts follow just one procedure. In the 
first instance, cases may be in the judgement phase (when the case is not decided yet) or in 
the enforcement phase (when the judicial decision or an extrajudicial credit will be enforced). 
Considering the method described in the previous section, the disposition time and the 
clearance rate of civil and commercial cases in Brazilian first instance courts are shown in 
Table 3.1. 
Table 3.12 
Disposition Time and Clearance Rate of Civil and Commercial Case First Instance in 
Brazil 














Judgement 5.837.356 15.045.830 7.766.410 707 133% 
Enforcement 1.838.812 6.161.576 1.728.814 1.301 94% 
Special 
Judgement 3.815.940 3.892.411 4.394.600 323 115% 




Judgement 1.814.400 1.243.785 2.304.063 197 127% 
Enforcement 815.616 2.416.904 924.348 954 113% 
  TOTAL 15.295.613 30.054.360 18.288.529 600 120% 
Source: prepared by the author based on CNJ data. 
 
The disposition time of civil and commercial cases in Brazilian first instance courts is 
600 days, but there is relevant variation depending on the court, the procedure and the phase 
of the case. The judgement of labor cases (197 days) is faster than the judgment in state 
courts, regardless if the judgement in the state court follows the common procedure (707 
days) or the special procedure (323 days). This result is unexpected, because special 
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procedures concentrate small claims cases that, in thesis, are simpler to decide. The speed in 
the judgement of labor cases may reflect the specialization of those courts, the specific labor 
procedural rules or even the quantity and quality of human resources available. However, 
when it comes to disposition time in the enforcement phase, the special procedure (404 days) 
is faster in comparison to the common procedure (1.301 days) and to the enforcement in labor 
courts (954 days). The cap in the value of claims that follow special procedure in state courts 
(40x minimum wage) may facilitate the enforcement of those cases. Cases following 
common procedure in state courts or cases brought to labor courts have no cap. 
The disposition time of judgements are always smaller than the time of the respective 
enforcement. This phenomenon occurs in state court common procedure (707 days in 
judgment vs. 1.301 days in enforcement), in state court special procedure (323 days in 
judgment vs. 404 days in enforcement) and in labor courts (197 days in judgment vs. 954 
days in enforcement). 
The clearance rate of civil and commercial cases in Brazilian first instance courts is 
120%. It means that first instance courts are able not just to cope with incoming cases but 
also to decided cases in the backlog. The clearance rates during the judgment phase should be 
highlighted because they all far exceed the 100% threshold (133% in state court common 
procedure, 115% in state court special procedure and 127% in labor courts). Nevertheless, the 
clearance rate during enforcements shows mixed results. While it is high in labor courts 
(113%), it is around the 100% threshold in state court special procedure and low in state court 
common procedure (94%). A specific negative note should be written about the enforcement 
in state court common procedure, because it has the highest disposition time (1.301 days) and 
the lowest clearance rate (94%) in the first instance, which means that the backlog of those 
cases is increasing.  Tables 3 and 4 show disposition time and clearance rates of civil and 
commercial cases in first instance courts of Brazil and European countries. 
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As stated in Table 3.2, the average disposition time of civil and commercial litigious 
cases in Brazilian first instance courts (600 days) is significantly higher than the average in 
Europe (232 days). It is higher than in all European countries monitored by CEPEJ, except 
from Greece (610 days). On the other hand, the average clearance rate of civil and 
commercial litigious cases in Brazilian first instance courts (120%) is higher than almost all 
European countries, as shown in Table 3.3. Just Slovakia (132%) and Finland (125%) achieve 
higher clearance rates than Brazil. A combination of disposition time and clearance rates of 
civil and commercial litigious cases at first instance courts is shown in Figure 3.1, offering a 
complete picture of the pace of cases in Brazil when compared to European countries: 
Figure 3.1 
Clearance Rate vs. Disposition Time for Civil and Commercial Cases at First Instance in 


















Disposition Time of Civil and Commercial 
Cases in First Instance Courts of Brazil 





1 Azerbaijan 25 
2 Russian Federation 42 
3 Morocco 86 
4 Lithuania 88 
5 Luxembourg 91 
6 Ukraine 96 
7 Switzerland 107 
8 Netherlands 121 
9 Slovakia 130 
10 Austria 133 
11 Estonia 139 
12 Republic of Moldova 140 
13 Czech Republic 153 
14 Romania 153 
15 Albania 159 
16 Hungary 159 
17 Norway 161 
18 Sweden 164 
19 Denmark 176 
20 Armenia 188 
21 Germany 196 
22 North Macedonia 223 
23 Poland 225 
24 Georgia 242 
25 Latvia 247 
26 Finland 252 
27 Montenegro 267 
28 Slovenia 280 
29 Spain 282 
30 Portugal 289 
31 Serbia 315 
32 Israel 333 
33 France 353 
34 Croatia 364 
35 Monaco 372 
36 Turkey 399 
37 Malta 432 
38 Italy 514 
39 Bosnia and Herzegovina 574 
40 BRAZIL 600 
41 Greece 610 
European Average 232 
Table 3.3 4 
Clearance Rates of Civil and Commercial 
Cases in First Instance Courts of Brazil 





1 Slovakia 132% 
2 Finland 125% 
3 BRAZIL 120% 
4 Croatia 118% 
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina 115% 
6 Italy 113% 
7 Portugal 112% 
8 Czech Republic 110% 
9 Malta 107% 
10 Slovenia 106% 
11 Germany 103% 
12 Spain 103% 
13 Austria 102% 
14 Belgium 102% 
15 Norway 102% 
16 Romania 102% 
17 Russian Federation 102% 
18 Denmark 101% 
19 Latvia 101% 
20 Netherlands 101% 
21 Switzerland 101% 
22 Luxembourg 100% 
23 Albania 99% 
24 France 99% 
25 Greece 99% 
26 Monaco 99% 
27 Poland 99% 
28 Sweden 99% 
29 Azerbaijan 98% 
30 Estonia 98% 
31 Hungary 98% 
32 Lithuania 98% 
33 Montenegro 98% 
34 Republic of Moldova 97% 
35 Ukraine 97% 
36 North Macedonia 95% 
37 Armenia 94% 
38 Serbia 94% 
39 Turkey 86% 
40 UK-Scotland 79% 
41 Georgia 77% 
42 Ireland 59% 
European Average 100% 
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In state courts, second instance decisions may follow common procedure or special 
procedure as well. In labor courts, second instance decisions follow just one procedure. As 
the enforcement of cases run only in first instance, there is no division of phase (judgement or 
enforcement) in the second instance. Considering the method described in the previous 
section, the disposition time and the clearance rate of civil and commercial cases in Brazilian 
second instance courts are shown in Table 3.4.  
The disposition time of civil and commercial cases in Brazilian second instance courts 
is 320 days, almost half the time in first instance courts (620 days). This result is expected 
because the collection of evidences in the second instance is more limited than in the first 
instance. Another possible reason is the absence of enforcement procedure in the second 
instance, an evident time-consuming phase in the first instance, as demonstrated above. 
Interestingly, there is little variation in disposition time among second instance courts, which 
are close to the mean regardless of the court and procedure.  
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 state disposition time and clearance rates of civil and commercial 
cases in second instance courts of Brazil and European countries.  
Table 3.4 5 
Disposition Time and Clearance Rate of Civil and Commercial Cases in First Instance in 
Brazil 










Common 1.894.316 1.778.880 1.956.645 332 103% 
Special 805.881 702.283 836.884 306 104% 
Labor Courts Common 898.104 792.223 941.356 307 105% 











Table 3.5 6 
Disposition Time of Civil and Commercial 
Cases in Second Instance Courts of Brazil 





 1 Russian Federation 31 
2 Ukraine 54 
3 Armenia 60 
4 Czech Republic 69 
5 Azerbaijan 72 
6 Estonia 95 
7 Slovenia 97 
8 Switzerland 97 
9 Republic of Moldova 100 
10 Sweden 100 
11 Lithuania 103 
12 Poland 105 
13 Turkey 109 
14 North Macedonia 111 
15 Portugal 114 
16 Hungary 121 
17 Slovakia 121 
18 Latvia 124 
19 Romania 131 
20 Denmark 141 
21 Finland 150 
22 Georgia 153 
23 Serbia 180 
24 Spain 181 
25 Germany 245 
26 BRAZIL 320 
27 Croatia 328 
28 Monaco 435 
29 Bosnia and Herzegovina 462 
30 France 487 
31 Luxembourg 553 
32 Malta 783 
33 Italy 993 
34 Greece 1 149 
European Average 215 
Table 3.6 7 
Clearance Rates of Civil and 
Commercial Cases in Second Instance 






1 Slovakia 125% 
2 Finland 119% 
3 Croatia 116% 
4 Italy 111% 
5 North Macedonia 111% 
6 Belgium 110% 
7 Denmark 109% 
8 Estonia 106% 
9 Luxembourg 106% 
10 Malta 106% 
11 Romania 106% 
12 BRAZIL 104% 
13 Armenia 103% 
14 Sweden 103% 
15 Czech Republic 102% 
16 Switzerland 102% 
17 Germany 101% 
18 Lithuania 101% 
19 Hungary 100% 
20 Russian Federation 100% 
21 Slovenia 100% 
22 Ukraine 100% 
23 Georgia 99% 
24 Republic of Moldova 99% 
25 Spain 98% 
26 Monaco 97% 
27 Portugal 97% 
28 Latvia 96% 
29 Poland 96% 
30 Azerbaijan 95% 
31 Bosnia and Herzegovina 95% 
32 France 95% 
33 Serbia 92% 
34 Ireland 82% 
35 Turkey 77% 
36 Greece 75% 
European Average 101% 
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The clearance rate of civil and commercial cases in Brazilian second instance courts is 
104%. Although much lower than the clearance rate in the first instance (120%), it is still 
above the 100% threshold, which means that second instance courts are dealing with 
incoming cases and a small part of the backlog. The lower level of clearance rate is expected, 
as the size of the backlog is smaller. Consequently, the pressure over second instance judges 
to reduce the backlog is also smaller.  
The relation between the size of the caseload and court productivity is well 
documented by legal empirical literature (Beenstock & Haitovsky, 2004; Dimitrova-Grajzl et. 
al., 2012; Gomes et al., 2017). There is little variation also in the clearance rate of second 
instance courts, which are all very close to the mean of 104%. 
The average disposition time of civil and commercial litigious cases in Brazilian 
second instance courts (320 days) is almost 50% higher than the average in Europe (215 
days). As demonstrated in Table 3.5, Brazilian second instance courts are slower than 25 of 
the 33 countries monitored by CEPEJ. The clearance rate of 140% is higher than most 
European countries, as shown in Table 3.6, but the position in the list (12nd place) is not so 
strong as the position of first instance courts (3rd position).  
A combination of disposition time and clearance rates of civil and commercial 
litigious cases at second instance courts is shown in Figure 3.2, offering a complete picture of 










Clearance Rate vs. Disposition Time for Civil and Commercial Cases at Second Instance in 











Source: CEPEJ (2018), adapted by the author. 
3.4 Conclusion 
Comparing the performance of courts from different countries is a challenging task 
and should be approached with caution. The legal and institutional characteristics of countries 
may affect the comparability of their judicial systems. This kind of study requires a thorough 
understanding of concepts used by different countries and plenty of quantitative data. The 
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice has made a remarkable effort to assure a 
clear understanding of the concepts used to evaluate the judicial systems of European 
countries. The Brazilian National Council of Justice has conducted a distinguished work to 
make detailed judicial data available to the public. The efforts of these two institutions 
enables a proper comparison of the duration of cases between Brazilian and European courts. 
Court disposition time in Brazil is significantly higher than in European countries. 
The situation is particularly critic in first instance courts. While disposition time of civil and 
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commercial litigious cases in first instance European courts is 232 days, in Brazil it is 600 
days, almost three times higher. This result would put those courts in the last place among 40 
countries analyzed by CEPEJ, except for Greece. Second instance Brazilian courts are also 
slower than their European counterparts. Even though not so problematic as first instance 
courts, disposition time of civil and commercial litigious cases in Brazilian second instance 
courts (320 days) are almost 50% higher than the European average (215 days).  
This result would put Brazilian second instance courts on the last quarter of the list of 
European countries. Considering this international comparison, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that case duration in Brazil is too long. The perception of Brazilian citizens about 
court disposition time is not biased. Court delay is a real problem in Brazil. 
However, current court disposition time reflect a backlog of cases accumulated along 
several years. Nowadays, Brazilian courts are not accumulating cases anymore. In fact, the 
number of civil and commercial decided cases is higher than the number of incoming cases. Both 
first and second instance courts have a clearance rate above 100%, which means that the backlog 
of cases is decreasing. The effort of first instance courts is especially impressive. With a clearance 
rate of 120%, they are quickly reducing their backlog. This effort is higher than almost all 
European countries. As a consequence, disposition time in Brazilian courts has a decreasing 
tendency. 
Preserve this tendency will be a great organizational challenge to Brazilian judicial 
system. The backlog of cases in Brazilian courts is huge. To achieve the average of 
disposition time in European countries, the clearance rate in Brazil must remain well above 
the 100% threshold for several years. It is possible that legal actors in the judicial system get 
tired of keeping the clearance rate on this level for such a long time. Moreover, when the 
backlog starts to decrease, the pressure over judges also starts to decrease, which may hurt 
judicial productivity. If judicial productivity deteriorates, the number of decided cases 
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diminishes and the clearance rate returns to the 100% level. In this scenario, the backlog of 
cases will stabilize and the tendency towards a faster court disposition time will be 
interrupted. To avoid this sequence of events, court administrators should keep judicial 
productivity under close control at least until court disposition time in Brazil get close to 
international standards. 
One point that deserves attention of policy makers is the enforcement of cases in state 
courts, where the number of decided cases is below the number of new cases, meaning that 
the backlog of those cases is increasing. Special focus should be put on the enforcement of 
cases following the common procedure, whose disposition time is the highest among those 
surveyed in this study, surpassing the symbolic limit of 1000 days. Even worst, the clearance 
rate of this group of cases is just 94%, which means that the backlog is growing rapidly. 
Future cross-country studies about court disposition time could focus on specific 
classes of civil cases. Labor cases seems to be an interesting class to be analyzed, considering 
that they are decided by specific courts in Brazil, that labor procedural laws in Brazil have 
recently been reformed and that CEPEJ has an explicit classification for those cases. 
Comparative research about the duration of cases could also center attention on other areas of 
law, as criminal or administrative cases, which follow distinct procedural rules and may 
present results very different of those presented in this study. As this study have evaluated 
only courts of first and second instance, a comparison of disposition time in superior courts 





4 Factors affecting Court Disposition Time in Brazil: Perception of Key Actors 
Abstract 
The duration of judicial cases is a complex phenomenon, associated to delay and court 
performance and could be analyzed from different perspectives. This paper aims to describe 
and discuss factors affecting disposition time of civil cases from the viewpoint of judges, 
prosecutors, and lawyers, named key actors. The data was collected from 15 in-depth 
interviews. Content analysis generated a list of 28 factors affecting the duration of civil cases. 
Those factors were clustered in three basic dimensions: institutional, jurisdictional and 
organizational. The paper concludes that institutional factors form two opposite phenomena 
named “judicial universalism” and “judicial aversion”, which have a major and negative 
impact on court speed. Although smaller, jurisdictional factors also seem to have a negative 
impact on celerity. Surprisingly, most organizational factors seem to have a positive impact on 
the pace of cases. These data are discussed, managerial recommendations and a research 
agenda are stated. 
Keywords: case duration, judicialization, judicial universalism, judicial aversion 
4.1 Introduction 
There is a growing awareness that a judiciary capable of resolving cases quickly and 
fairly is an important prerequisite for social and economic development. Delays in resolving 
court cases undermine public confidence in the judicial system and disappoint those seeking 
compensation through legal proceedings (Heise, 2000). Judicial delay increases retards 
economic development (Buscaglia & Ulen, 1997) and have a negative effect on investments 
(Castelar, 2009), on the credit market (Chemin, 2010) and on price and delivery speed of 
public works (Coviello et al., 2013). 
Different countries face court congestion and delay. This problem occurs in Latin 
America (Buscaglia & Ulen, 1997) and in parts of Europe (Bielen et al., 2015), as well as in 
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Asian and African countries (Jiang, 2005; Hazra & Micevska, 2004; Chemin, 2010; Kondylis 
& Stein, 2018; Grajzl & Silwal, 2020). Judicial reforms aiming to reduce case duration have 
been introduced, however most countries have not succeeded on this matter (Bielen, et al., 
2018).  
The factors impacting case dura are multiple and can be analyzed from different 
perspectives. The expected duration is systematically higher in countries with more 
formalized proceedings, as civil law countries (Djankov, 2003). Ambiguities in the civil 
procedure code also lengthens trial duration (Chemin, 2009). Empirical evidence suggest that 
higher caseload leads to higher levels of congestion (Murrel, 2001). The amount of human 
resources allocated in courts appear to have an impact on judicial speed. Court congestion 
may be reduced depending on the number of judges (Hazra & Micevska, 2004; Dalton & 
Singer, 2009) and the number of judicial employees (Mitsopoulos & Pelagidis, 2007). 
Factors impacting the duration of judicial cases remains unclear and more research on 
that subject is “urgently necessarily” (Berlemann & Christmann, 2020, p. 2). In order to fill in 
this gap, this study aims to describe and discuss factors affecting court disposition time in a 
civil law country, from the viewpoint of judges, prosecutors, and lawyers. The focus of the 
investigation was the duration of civil cases in federal and state courts in Brazil. Court delay 
represented 68% of the complains made to Brazilian National Council of Justice in 2018 
(CNJ, 2019) and it is the first reason why people avoiding sue in the country (AMB, 2019). 
Therefore, Brazil seems to be an appropriate place to investigate factors affecting court 
disposition time. 
4.2 Method and Data 
The research was undertaken between 2019 and 2020. Data was collected through in-
depth interviews with 15 key actors of the Brazilian judicial system about factors affecting 
the duration of judicial cases. To be a key actor, the respondent must comply with two 
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criteria. The first one is to be a judge, a prosecutor, or a lawyer. Judicial cases form a 
triangular relation, with two sides in a dispute and a third element that decides the case. It can 
be said that lawyers, prosecutors, and judges are the main actors forming this triangle. The 
second criterion is having some connection with the administration of justice, for instance, 
large experience, academic work or professional position connected to this issue. 
Of the 15 respondents, eight were judges (federal and state judges who work in first 
and second instances of Brazilian courts), five were lawyers (public and private lawyers) and 
two prosecutors (one federal prosecutor and one state prosecutor); thirteen were men and two 
were women. The interviewed worked in all regions of Brazil, their average age was 47 
years; the youngest was 34 years old and the oldest was 60 years old. The average length of 
the interviewees’ careers was 21 years, ranging from 10 to 37 years. The average length of 
the interviews was 55 minutes; the shortest took 32 minutes to complete and the longest, 93 
minutes. As the interviews were being taken, answers started to become repetitive. The last 
three respondents repeated almost the same answers given during the previous interviews, 
adding little new information to the list of factors affecting the duration of cases. At that 
moment, it was considered that a saturation point was reached. 
All the interviews were recorded and transcribed. They were analyzed using content 
analysis techniques, in two stages: identification of the structure of each interview, and 
analysis of the transversal and common issues along the interviews (Bardin, 2011). The first 
stage was identifying the factors described by the respondents in each interview. Then, a list 
of factors from all interviews was built. In the second stage those factors were grouped into 
categories and these into dimensions. For example, the factor “low litigation costs” was 
allocated in the category “legal factor”, which belongs to the “institutional dimension”. The 
main results related to each dimension are presented and discussed below. 
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4.3 Institutional Dimension 
The institutional dimension encompasses legal, cultural, and social factors. Legal 
factors were considered as those directly related to the law. Some legal rules seem to foster 
the judicialization of disputes, generating court congestion. One legal issue connected to 
judicialization can be defined as “low deterrence”, the low capacity of the legal system to 
punish wrong behavior appropriately, generating a deterrent effect and avoiding the 
emergence of disputes. Some respondents explained that litigation represents an economic 
advantage for large litigants. As commented by interviewee 1: “For large litigants, litigation 
is cheap. They prefer to commit a borderline conduct, perhaps violating user rights, because 
they know that not everyone will sue.” 
Large litigants are defined in the literature as Repeated Players who engage in many 
similar litigations over time while One-Shotters have only occasional recourse to the courts 
(Galanter, 1974). Cases filed against Repeated Players are not enough to produce a deterrent 
effect: just part of the plaintiffs bring their cases to courts and the value of judgement in those 
cases are limited to compensate the plaintiffs for their damages (system of compensatory 
damages), instead of punishing the wrong behavior of defendants (system of punitive 
damages). While Brazilian civil law adopts the system of compensatory damages, the United 
States adopts the system of punitive damages. About this issue, respondent 6 stated: “I would 
suggest the adoption of punitive damages against large litigants … Punishment must be 
higher than the benefit from the irregularity, otherwise it becomes a stimulus.” This 
suggestion is consistent with the law and economic literature, according to which failure to 
impose punitive damages would result in inadequate deterrence (Polinsky & Shavell, 1998). 




A second legal factor, also connected to judicialization, is the “judicial enforcement of 
tax cases”. A significant amount of judicial litigation is intended to collect tax debts. Federal, 
state and municipal governments bring tax cases to courts, in order to combat tax evasion. 
Brazilian tax authorities do not have powers to promote debtor’s patrimonial constriction 
directly. After administrative procedures to collect the debt, they must bring the case to the 
courts. Interviewee 11 commented this point: “Instead of a judge freezing assets, a tax 
authority should do that administratively. If the debtor does not agree, he bring the case to 
court … It is so in most countries. Few countries are like Brazil”. The same respondent 
explains that other Brazilian officers have the power to conduct patrimonial constriction and 
even patrimonial destruction in other situations:  
Tax auditors may detain goods during import and export procedures, environmental 
auditors may arrest and burn tractors in the forest, sanitary inspectors may close 
restaurants. When it comes to tax enforcement, all constrictions must be ordered by a 
judge. Why?  
Administrative enforcement of tax cases requires legal reforms, but those reforms face the 
resistance of many actors. Respondent 11 reveals:  
Courts resist because they do not want to transfer this power to the Executive; lawyers 
do not want to lose lawsuits in which they … collect fees; and debtors … want a long 
time-consuming process, which they can monitor to make an asset redirection. 
A third legal factor is the “lack of private discovery”. Discovery is a pre-trial 
procedure in which each party can obtain evidence from the other party or from non-parties. 
While in some countries discovery does not go much beyond facilitating voluntary 
exchanges, in other countries there are laws that require litigants to disclose information 
(Spier, 2005). The laws of procedure in the United States permit each side in a dispute to 
submit questions that the other side must answer before the trial begins, interview the other 
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side's witnesses under oath, requisition documents, and inspect physical objects in dispute 
(Cooter & Rubinfeld, 1994). As parties are required to collect evidence before bringing the 
case to the court, procedural steps to collect evidence during the trial are reduced or even 
eliminated, which decreases the duration of cases. Suggesting the adopting of discovery in 
Brazil, respondent 6 commented:  
You can make lawyers get in touch with each other. They would limit the scope of the 
claim, bring the legal controversial issue and require just the controversial evidence. 
We should not obligate the taxpayer to spend on mediation rooms and collection of 
uncontroversial evidence. 
Besides reducing procedural steps during the judgement, discovery also stimulates 
private conciliation. In fact, if parties always have the opportunity to voluntarily settle their 
dispute out of court instead of resorting to litigation, why they go to court? A possible reason 
is that parties usually have divergent expectations about judgement. While plaintiffs tend to 
overestimate the expected judgment at trial, defendants tend to underestimate it (Bar-Gill, 
2005). Trial will occur when the plaintiff is sufficiently more optimistic about winning than 
the defendant believes he should be (Kaplow & Shavell, 2002). When the parties are both 
optimistic, at least one of them is uninformed. 
Revealing information to correct the other side's false optimism increases settlements 
and decreases trials (Cooter & Rubinfeld, 1994). As much information is acquired and comes 
to be shared by the opposing sides, beliefs of the two sides tend to be similar (Kaplow & 
Shavell, 2002). In the United States, the vast majority of cases that are filed ultimately settle 
before trial and countless others are settled before a case is filed at all (Spier, 2005). 
Respondent 12 commented this point: “Why are there so many agreements in US? Because 
the model was made that way. The parties are required to switch evidence in pre-procedural 
stage. There is an incentive to conciliation. There are conflicts, but they are not judicialized”. 
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In Brazil, there is a lack of legal provisions about legal discovery. One side is not 
obligated to disclose information to the other side prior to judicial litigation. Interviewee 13 
clarify the origin of the problem: “The number of times the parties speak before the sentence 
may be extended ad eternum. Why? Because the Italian concept of parlare primo (speak first, 
prove later). Our procedural code comes from the Italian code of 1930”. Interrogatories, 
depositions, requisition documents, and permission to enter land are official procedures that 
require a judicial order to be executed. Without those instruments, parties are not stimulated 
to solve their disputes directly. On the contrary, they are forced to bring their cases to the 
court. Optimistic parties judicialize the dispute and courts have an obligation to foster 
conciliation between them (conciliation hearing became mandatory in Brazil in 2016). This 
obligation seems to make sense, as any conciliation made at the beginning of the lawsuit will 
spare time of litigants and judges. However, without enough information, the chances of 
conciliation at this stage are low. Most conciliations fail and cases are submitted to judicial 
decision. 
Information sharing will decrease but not eliminate divergent expectations between 
parties. Even after information sharing, it is possible that parties will not perfectly agree on 
the judgement probability. If the divergence is not so high, litigation costs may avoid 
judicialization. However, litigation costs in Brazil seem to be low. “Low litigation costs” was 
one of the legal factors most reported by interviewees. The cost of court fees and the cost of 
the lawyer of the other side (if the plaintiff loses the case) depend on the legal rule that 
allocates those costs between parties. Under American rule each party bears just her own 
costs and under British rule the loser at trial bears also the winner’s costs (Bar-Gill, 2005). 
The adverse consequences of losing a case are more severe under the British rule because the 
loser will pay not just his own costs, but also the costs of the other side. 
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All Brazilian cases brought to Small Claims Courts are free of charge, regardless of 
the wealth of litigants. In 2018, 30% of new cases in State Justice and 63% of new cases in 
Federal Justice were filed in these courts (CNJ, 2019). In ordinary procedure, some actions 
are also free and people with insufficient resources have gratuitous justice. In 2018, 30% of 
cases closed in the State Justice and 36% of cases in Federal Justice of Brazil were classified 
as gratuitous justice (CNJ, 2019). 
As costs are eliminated, any litigation represents just possible benefits to the plaintiff. 
Respondent 8 explains this point: “You have almost universal gratuity. The party does not 
pay costs, does not pay attorney's fees or other expenses. People litigate without fear of 
defeat”. Rich people or large companies may use judicial services for free. One interesting 
example is brought by respondent 11: “Companies do not use ordinary procedure in tax 
cases. To avoid paying litigation costs, they use a Writ of Mandamus against the chief of the 
Internal Revenue Service. When you have no cost or risk, why don't you try?”. The opinion 
of respondents seems to confirm a hypothesis raised by theoretical studies in Brazil, which 
proposed that indistinctively granted gratuitous justice may lead to overuse of courts and 
judicial slowness (Arake & Gico Jr., 2014; Gico Jr., 2014). 
One possible reason to explain why Brazilian legal system is so generous with those 
who want to bring a case to courts may be found in the recent history of the country. During 
the period 1964–1985, Brazilians lived under a dictatorship and some rights were restricted. 
Interviewee 7 speculates that dictatorship provoked “a kind of trauma that no one can be 
victim of governmental arbitrariness. So now the judicial system will have to serve 
everyone.” According to him, this trauma led to court congestion and judicial delay. The 
same respondent explains that all these conditions favoring litigation seem to benefit middle 
and upper classes citizens but are unable to guarantee access to courts for the poor people:  
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Judicial gratuity did not solve the problem of access to justice for the poor. If you plot 
the addresses of litigation in São Paulo city, it is all in the center, the richer part. In 
poor neighborhoods there is a jurisdictional blackout, nobody sues anyone. There, 
they resolve their problems by themselves. 
The “Brazilian Labor reform” implemented at the end of 2017 offer a piece of 
evidence that changes in the allocation of litigation costs may reduce judicialization. The 
reform changed the rule of litigation costs: before the reform, each side supported his own 
litigation costs and after, the loser supports litigation costs of both sides. This change seems 
to have been decisive to the reduction in the number of new labor cases filed per year in first 
instance labor courts, which has dropped from 2.648.463 to 1.748.074, from 2017 to 2018 
(CNJ, 2019). 
The private decision of litigants to invest time and money in a lawsuit are not 
generally aligned with the interests of the society (Shavell, 1997). The judicial system is an 
expensive social institution, raising the question of whether the amount of litigation is 
socially appropriate. In some circumstances, the plaintiff will litigate too often while in others 
he will not litigate often enough (Spier, 2005). In general, plaintiffs will sue when the 
benefits of litigation are higher than the expected costs (Shavell, 1982). However, when a 
plaintiff contemplates litigation, he considers only his own costs; he does not take into 
account the defendant’s costs or the state’s costs that his suit will engender (Kaplow and 
Shavell, 2002). Parties involved in litigation do not bear all the costs of a trial—the salaries of 
judges and judicial assistants, the forgone value of juror time, or implicit rent of court 
buildings. As plaintiffs consider just their own private costs, they may litigate too often. 
In contrast, the plaintiff does not recognize as a benefit to himself the social benefit of 
suit, its deterrent effect on the behavior of injurers. Even if a lawsuit would be convenient to 
punish some wrong behavior, the plaintiff will not bring a suit if his benefit is lower than his 
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cost. This would justify the state’s supporting litigation because plaintiffs may be not 
litigating enough (Kaplow & Shavell, 2002). Due to fundamental differences between private 
and social incentives to use the legal system, the level of litigation in a country can either be 
socially excessive or insufficient (Shavell, 1997). 
 The interviewees suggest that the level of litigation in Brazil is socially excessive. The 
external selectivity of cases is the ability of the judicial system to select cases considered 
relevant from a social point of view (Fix Fierro, 2003). Due to low deterrence, judicial 
enforcement of tax cases, lack of private discovery and low litigation costs, the external 
selectivity of cases in Brazil is inappropriate. Brazilian legal system also seems to have 
problems in the internal selectivity of cases. Internal selectivity is the ability to select which 
judicial decisions should be revised by a higher court (Fix Fierro, 2003). 
 The interviewees suggest that the level of litigation in Brazil is socially excessive. 
Low deterrence, judicial enforcement of tax cases, lack of private discovery and low 
litigation costs are legal factors that induce judicialization. The external selectivity of cases is 
the ability of the judicial system to select cases considered relevant from a social point of 
view (Fix Fierro, 2003). Brazilian legal system seems to be unable to select which disputes 
should be brought by courts. 
According to most respondents, the “number, nature and effect of appeals” are 
inappropriate. Interviewee 7 states that “we have a multitude of appeals in which the debtor 
can delay the end of the case, avoiding payment and liability for his obligations”. Although 
the new Brazilian civil procedural code represented an advance, the number of appeals is still 
high. According to interviewee 11, “even after the reform, we still have 1000 appeal 
possibilities”. Some respondents explained that the country legal system has four instances 
and advocated the idea that all judicial decisions must become res judicata in the second 
instance. For respondent 6, there is no contradiction between this idea and the protection of 
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procedural rights of litigants. He explained that in Italy and in the United States, countries 
with very different legal traditions, cases became res judicata in the second instance. 
Besides the number, the nature and the effect of appeals were stated as problems to 
the flow of cases. One of the factors impacting the rate of appeal in a judicial system is the 
nature of the appeal, which can be a right of the appellant, normally at a first level court, or a 
discretionary appeal, when a latter court has the power to choose which appeals will be 
decided (Fix-Fierro, 2003). In Brazil, all appeals are a right of the appellant. No court has 
discretion to choose which appeals deserve revision. Any case may reach the Brazilian 
Supreme Court, including private disputes filed in Small Claims Courts. Respondent 11 
commented this issue: “You may always bring your case to the Supreme Court. You just need 
to claim a constitutional issue. It is very easy to eternalize a discussion”. 
The effect of appeals is also a problem. If an appeal is filed, the effects of the original 
judicial decision are immediately suspended. As first instance judicial decisions do not have 
immediate effects, lawyers do not take them seriously: “A lawyer friend of mine says that the 
case starts just after the sentence” (interviewee 14). The inappropriate design of the appeal 
process has consequences for the enforcement of judicial decisions as well. According to 
respondent 10: “The legal mechanisms and appeals made available to the parties is a factor 
that contributes significantly to a delay during the enforcement phase”. 
Two legal factors described by interviewees are especially related to the time to 
enforce legal decisions. A first problem is treating the enforcement phase almost as a brand-
new second case. Brazilian civil procedural system has an Italian origin, where the 
enforcement of a judicial decision is a second case. Interviewee 13 elucidates this topic: “The 
Italian model was created in the 20s/30s by Chiovenda. He idealized the idea of satisfied 
demand and resisted demand. So, we have a bi-procedural process, with all the imaginable 
vicissitudes of a second process”. 
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Many discussions seem to emerge during the enforcement phase because they were 
not addressed during the judgement phase. Judicial decisions in ordinary procedure do not 
need to be liquid, i.e., they do not need to express how much one side need to pay to the other 
side. Respondent 10 analyzed this matter: “In the ordinary procedure, you have many debates 
in the enforcement phase because judges do not liquidate their decisions during the 
judgement phase. This problem does not happen in the special procedure, where judges must 
pronounce liquid sentences”. A similar problem seems to happen in collective actions. The 
interviewee 1 stated:  
The individual particularities do not appear during the judgement of a collective 
action. When execution begins and calculations need to be made, new questions arise, 
and a very broad cognition is reopened. The enforcement becomes a new case, 
discussing a lot of issues. 
Another legal factor impacting the time to enforce judicial decisions is the “debtor 
protection”. Brazilian legislation has some rules to protect specific assets. If a family lives in 
his own house, it is considered a “family property” and creditors cannot use this property 
during enforcement procedures, regardless of its value. According to respondent 2, courts 
give a benevolent interpretation to this rule: 
The property and the goods that cover it are considered family assets, regardless of 
their quantity or sumptuousness. If you are a debtor and have an 85-inch LED 
television, you will not lose it, even if your creditor has no television at his home. If 
you have an apartment of 5 or 10 million reais at the seaside, you do not lose it 
because it is the apartment where you live (Respondent 2). 
Besides family property, other assets are also protected. The salary of debtors cannot 
be pledged to pay debts, even if the salary of the debtor is much higher than the salary of the 
creditor. Deposits in savings accounts cannot be frozen up to a limit. Interviewee 8 explains 
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that those rules disappoints parties who seek the judicial system, including the small 
creditors:  
We should reduce the protection of debtors. If you have up to R$ 40,000 deposited in 
a savings account, you will not lose it. Faced with situations like this, we often 
frustrate the satisfaction of small credits of under-paid parts. 
Many cultural factors were appointed by the interviewees. The first one is the 
“Culture of Litigation” that seems to be present in Brazilian society. A culture of litigation 
means that all disputes are brought to the judicial system, including very small day-to-day 
conflicts. Respond 8 states: “There is a judicialization of all matters of life. Today neighborly 
fights, disagreements in the workplace …  traffic discussions, relationships in social 
networks, all those matters may be brought to courts.” This behavior would reflect an 
immature society, unable to solve their disputes without a judge. According to interviewee 1, 
“There is a culture of litigation. This perhaps reflects an infant society that wants a judge 
deciding several issues in his life, such as moral damages because a person was excluded 
from a WhatsApp group”. 
The “Culture of Delay” was also mentioned by respondents and appear to be spread 
throughout society. Some judicial actors think that the long duration of cases is a fact of life 
and take court delay for granted. “Courts think that delay is normal” (respondent 5). The 
culture of delay is also present in the behavior of litigants. Respondent 6 explains that some 
litigants seem not to be committed to a quickly solution to the case: “There is no hurry. It's 
not fancy to be in a hurry. The parties act as if they had a lot of money.” Interviewee 15 think 
that the culture of delay is changing in Brazil and describes the practice of conciliation that 
was started in the state legal office he manages: “In 2018 we signed 3 or 4 agreements. In 
2019 we created the Chamber of Conciliations, by law. In 2019 we made 300 agreements. In 
2020, even with the COVID crisis, we reached 700 agreements until July.” 
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Close connected to the culture of delay is the “Culture of Irresponsibility”, according 
to which people transfer the responsibility for the delay to someone else. The behavior of 
avoiding working or having responsibility over procedures was stated by interviewee 3: 
Someone needs to digitalize printed cases. The prosecutor’s office alleges that this is a 
rule created by the court and sends the case to the court. The court says that the 
prosecutor’s office is the plaintiff interested in the case and sends the case back. 
Another cultural reason appointed by respondents is the “Culture of Formalism”. 
Many actors in the judicial system are used to bureaucratic procedures. According to the 
interviewee 1, “the legal system encourages freedom of forms, but the formalistic culture of 
legal operators—including the judge—complicates the search for practical solutions”. A 
revealing example of this cultural problem was described by respondent 4, who explained 
that some time ago, judicial decisions were followed by mandates written by court assistants. 
Nowadays, there is no need to this mandate because the judicial decision itself is considered a 
mandate. However, especially in small towns, court assistants insist on producing the 
mandate. 
A very important and commented issue can be described as the “Culture of 
Nonconformity”, according to which people never agree with a third-party decision, even 
when this third party is a judge. “If the judicial decision is not favorable to the party, his 
lawyer simply appeal to the next instance. This is the most important factor to explain the 
duration of cases in Brazil.” (respondent 5). According to interviewee 6, this resistance to 
follow rules and orders is generalized in the society: “There is a distrust in the state. We do 
not accept orders given by an authority, even if this authority is legitimized by the 
constitution. In Latin America we are refractory to any authority.” The resistance described 
here is based in good faith. People resist because they think they should have won the case. 
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However, there is a kind of resistance based on bad faith. It is the “Culture of 
Trickery”, when the losing party knows that judicial decision is correct, but still try to avoid 
the consequences of a lawsuit. Those parties start to play “procedural games.” One typical 
behavior connected to the culture of trickery is avoiding judicial notification. According to 
respondent 3: “Defendants evade subpoenas and hearings, witnesses evade hearings. The 
judge imposes fines on the witnesses and notify the witnesses again. Them, they appear in 
court, crying desperately, asking the judge to cancel the fine”. Parties and lawyers play with 
procedural rules in order to maintain some previous situation. According to Respondent 6:  
We have lawyers who don't lose the lawsuit because the lawsuit never ends. It's a 
catchphrase: “I may not win, but if I don't win, the case never ends.” This is a way to 
keep his client in possession of land, a way of procrastinating a payment.”  
Social factors also emerged during the research, as “the number of lawyers” in Brazil. 
Lawyers are experts on the law and should weigh their options carefully, helping their clients 
to make prudent decisions in litigation. This could be true specially under contingent fees, 
where the attorney receives a percentage of the judgment but receives nothing if the case is 
lost. A fee arrangement linked to lawyers’ performance imposes risk on lawyers (Kaplow & 
Shavell, 2002). Through the contingent fee, it is expected that attorneys will pursue only 
cases that are more likely to win (Spier, 2005). However, where the number of lawyers is too 
high, the cost of lawyers tends to decrease, and lawyers will assume more risk, accepting 
cases with low chances of winning. In this scenario, lawyers would stop to act as a filter to 
frivolous suits and would become an actor to promote them. In the face of this competitive 
legal market, lawyers in Brazil seem to accept working under contingent fees and plaintiffs 
have no costs with lawyers. Many respondents alluded to the connection between the number 
of lawyers and the number of lawsuits in Brazil. This opinion resonates with other studies, 
which found evidence that an increase in the number of lawyers is associated with an increase 
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in court litigation in Italy (Buonanno & Galizzi, 2014) and in Spain (Mora-Sanguinetti & 
Garoupa, 2015). 
The “legal education” in Brazil also seems to favor judicial litigation, provoking court 
delay. According to some respondents, law schools do not teach students how to seek a 
consensual solution. They are not trained for conciliation, mediation, arbitration, and 
negotiation. “We were trained to litigate. We are trained to fight.” (Respondent 1). One 
interviewee sad that this scenario is changing. “You have to change the culture of legal actors 
since college. A new resolution of the National Council of Education determines that 
conciliation is a compulsory class in the curricula of law schools” (Respondent 4). 
A final social factor that impact the enforcement of judicial decisions is the low 
income of some defendants. According to respondent 1: “There are people with chronic 
financial situation, who have no assets”. There are even more melancholic situations. 
According to respondent 9, paying a debt may affect the nutritional necessity of some 
litigants: “He will prioritize eating. He will not stop eating to pay a bill.” Table 4.1 
summarizes factors belonging to the institutional dimension. 
4.4 Jurisdictional Dimension 
The jurisdictional dimension is internal to the courts, linked to the exercise of the 
legal function, to the way that judicial cases are decided. The jurisdictional dimension reveals 
how the work conducted by judges may impact the duration of cases. The jurisdictional 
factors reported by the respondents were divided in three categories: jurisprudential 
instability, decisional procrastination, and judicial benevolence. 
Jurisprudential instability occurs when judges do not follow precedents established by 
superior courts (vertical instability) or when superior courts do not follow their own 
precedents (horizontal instability). The operation with binding precedents demands 
knowledge of decisional technics and concepts that Brazilian judges, formed in civil law 
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tradition, are not familiar with (Barroso, 2016). According to interviewee 2, “we have a 
problem in Brazil with this shift to a system based on precedents. We do not have a culture of 
working with precedents yet”. One aspect about this learning process is that superior courts, 
when deciding a precedent, do not explore and address all divergences present in the case. 
Due to this incomplete precedent formation, litigants continue to bring cases to courts and to 
appeal: “superior courts must produce precedents with solid arguments. It is not making a 
300-page judgment. It may be 10 pages, but it needs to have important arguments.” 
(respondent 2). This perception is in line with Berlemann and Christmann (2020) results. 
Based on German 576 first instance court rulings, these authors confirm that when prior court 
decisions are cited the length of trials is shorter. 
Table 4.18 
Institutional Factors Affecting Court Disposition Time 
Category Factor 
Effect: 
Before the Case 
(Judicialization) 
During the Case 
(Judgement) 
After the Case 
(Enforcement) 
Legal 
Low Deterrence X   
Judicial Enforcement of Tax Cases X   
Lack of Private Discovery X X  
Low Litigation Costs X X X 
Number, Nature and Effect of Appeals  X X 
Enforcement as a second case   X 
Debtor Protection   X 
Cultural 
Culture of Litigation X   
Culture of Nonconformity X X X 
Culture of Trickery X X X 
Culture of Delay  X X 
Culture of Irresponsibility  X X 
Culture of Formalism  X X 
Social 
Number of Lawyers X X X 
Legal Education X X X 




Another jurisdictional category impacting the duration of cases is decisional 
procrastination, a phenomenon that occurs in all instances of the judicial system, for different 
reasons. Decisional procrastination is reflected in the judgment of “repetitive cases in 
Superior Courts”, which seem to be especially harmful. According to interviewee 1: 
“Sometimes issues of immense repercussion are judicialized, superior courts suspend those 
cases, but do not decided the dispute even after several months. Those issues should be 
decided quickly. It would make a huge difference.” 
The “avoidance of polemic or complex cases” is also related to decisional 
procrastination. Judges use conciliation hearings as an instrument to postpone decisions, even 
if the judge knows that this conciliation hearing has no chance of success. One extreme 
example was described by interviewee 3: “In a case filed in 2014, 8 conciliation hearings 
were designated, none with final conciliation. The judge asks the parties for information and 
reschedules a new conciliation hearing. The case stops. He does not judge and blames the 
parties.” Another instrument used by judges to postpone decisions is sending the case to the 
judicial calculation sector or to the parties in circumstances when those steps are unnecessary. 
About this topic, respondent 12 stated that “legal conflicts must be decided by the judge, but 
he doesn't decide. He produces acts (sends them to the accounting department, to the other 
party) and goes on. My perception is that it's not just insecurity, it's laziness.” 
Judges are rational and pursue economic goals of the same general kind and in the 
same general way that private persons do, so in considering how much time to allocate to 
judging, the rational judge will consider the negative impact on his leisure (Posner, 1993). As 
complex cases are time-consuming, judges have an economic incentive to avoid judging 
those cases. The multitasking model (Holmstrom & Milgrom, 1991) shows that if an agent is 
given two objectives—say, quality and productivity—, and only one of those objectives can 
be measured and monitored, then the agent will shirk on the hard-to-measure objective and 
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invest in achieving the other (Choi, 2007). The National Council of Justice establishes a 
number of goals for courts (CNJ, 2020). According to Goal 2, courts must decide certain 
percentage of old cases. Respondent 6 explained that this goal is not able to address the 
problem and described strategies used by judges: “According to goal 2, judges must decide 
80% of the cases filed in 2016. They do not decide the other 20% because they are complex. 
Instead of judging a complex case from 2000, they could decide 5 repetitive cases”. 
The behavior of courts that allow or even incentive the delay is defined as “Judicial 
benevolence”. One aspect of judicial benevolence is the resistance to impose penalties, as 
commented by respondent 9:  
Judges are still very resistant to impose penalties. They realize that some appeals are 
filed with the unique purpose of delaying the case, but they still do not apply the 
penalties, not even after the new provisions established in the procedural code. 
The benevolent interpretation of procedural rules was commented by respondent 14:  
The new procedural code brought an exhaustive list of the hypotheses for instrumental 
appeal. What did the Superior Court of Justice? The court decided that the list is not 
exhaustive, that those hypotheses are just examples, that the appeal may be used when 
something can cause damage. 
Defensive jurisprudence was described as the behavior of superior courts in using 
formalistic barriers to dismiss appeals. Contrary to the other factors, defensive jurisprudence 
has positive consequences for the pace of courts. As appeals are dismissed, cases end earlier. 
Commenting this point, interviewee 12 stated: “There is a survival behavior of the higher 
courts in creating more filters than those provided by law, in order to reduce the volume of 
cases. It is the jurisprudential defense”. Judicial benevolence and defensive jurisprudence are 
diametrically opposed. Legal interpretation is too soft in the first, and too hard in the later. 
Factors belonging to the jurisdictional dimension are stated in Table 4.2. 
69 
 
Table 4.2 9 
Jurisdictional Factors Affecting Court Disposition Time 
Category Factor 
Effect 
Before the Case 
(Judicialization) 
During the Case 
(Judgement) 




Vertical and Horizontal X X X 
Decisional 
Procrastination 
Repetitive cases in Superior Courts  X X 
Avoidance of complex/polemic cases  X X 
Judicial 
benevolence  
Penalty aversion  X X 
Interpretation of appeal's rules  X X 
Defensive 
Jurisprudence 
Restriction of appeals in Superior 
Courts 
 X X 
 
4.5 Organizational Dimension 
The organizational dimension discusses factors related to the internal structure of 
courts as bureaucratic organizations. Factors regarding the organizational dimension were 
divided in three categories: human resources, technology, and management factors. 
Regarding to human resources, no respondent has complained about the quantity and 
quality of judges or judicial assistants in federal courts. However, the circumstances are 
different at state courts. One first problem in state courts is the quantity of judges. As the 
number of state judges is low, they must respond for multiple offices, as detailed by a state 
judge:  
When the National Council of Justice asks why do you have a case for more than 100 
days, you explain that you are responsible for two or three judicial offices. I do not 
provide a satisfactory jurisdiction in neither of them (interviewee 10).  
However, according to most of the respondents, the main problem related to human resources 
in state courts seem to be a deficit in the quantity and the quality of judicial assistants. About 
this problem, respondent 1 stated: “Sometimes there are just two judicial assistants in the 
office, and they come from the local city hall, they are not professional judicial assistants”. 
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Respondents repeatedly cited technology as one important factor to explain the 
duration of cases in Brazil, involving both software and hardware issues. The development of 
electronic systems to control the flow of cases through the courts was appointed as decisive 
to reduce case disposition time. Interviewee 2 explained that the system automatized many 
procedures, reducing the “dead time” of the cases, those moments that consume time but do 
not generate value to the judicial decision. The use of technology is fostered by the National 
Council of Justice, which choose one standard electronic system to be used by courts. Courts 
are forming a community of development and tools developed by one court may be easily 
exported to other courts. Interviewee 14 commented this point: “The state court of Rondonia 
developed an AI tool. The federal court in Sao Paulo took this tool and made a robot able to 
read cases and propose a draft of a decision”. 
Courts also have invested in technology during enforcement proceedings. Powerful 
technological tools are used to locate and confiscate debtors’ assets. Nowadays, a single 
judicial command is enough to confiscate capital deposited in bank accounts. According to 
respondent 8: “By filling in a simple electronic form, you block all banking accounts in 48 
hours. You have access to the most liquid asset to satisfy any type of obligation, which is 
money, at low cost and high efficiency”. Another system cited by interviewees is designed to 
identify the ownership of automobiles and to block their transference to other people. 
 Although powerful, some electronic systems are very time-consuming, as a system 
created to detect if the debtor has assets in the name of another person. Other systems are still 
in an early stage of development, as a system to locate and block the transference of buildings 
and other real estate properties. Some judges seem to have difficulties to manage 
technological tools or to resist the idea that part of his job has a digital component. This 
behavior may have a negative impact on the duration of cases, as explained by respondent 9:  
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I do not know if by accommodation or because they have trouble operating the 
systems, but some judges are not making a proper use of them (technological tools). 
They should use those tools to shorten the duration of cases, but they resist. So, 
enforcement proceedings get locked. 
Some interviewees posed very interesting questions about the role of courts during the 
enforcement phase. According to them, locating debtors and assets is not a jurisdictional 
function. They argue that this function should be done by the parties who are interested in the 
success of the enforcement and that the time of judges and judicial assistants could have been 
used to perform jurisdictional activities. Respondent 6 expresses his concerns about this 
point: “I don't understand why the judge, who should be deciding cases, would spend time 
doing a collection activity. I could sit and search the systems. But I could be deciding another 
case”. In common law countries not just the location of assets but also the constriction of 
assets is done by private companies. Respondent 13 explains: “Common law models do not 
consider the execution phase. If you owe $ 1,000, the lender can use administrative means. 
There are companies in the US specialized in constricting assets. Finding the guy's car, 
sealing the car.”  
Hardware and infrastructure of communication seem to have different impact on 
Brazilian federal and state courts. While federal courts seem to have reasonable IT 
infrastructure, state courts face some problems. A state judge (respondent 6) described the 
situation: 
I type the name and wait, type the Social Security Number and wait. If I used my cell 
phone, I would type everything, hit enter and then send. These short breaks respond 
for more than 40% of my time using the system and I only work using the system. 
 Performance indicators and the control of judicial activity were the most important 
management factors cited during the research. Many respondents emphasized the importance 
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of the performance indicators and targets defined by the National Council of Justice. Some 
judges have mentioned the tools to control caseload and duration of cases in judicial offices. 
Respondent 2 revealed that “we are developing a Business Intelligence Panel called 
‘Management at your Fingertips’. This panel gives access to several indicators, such as the 
average case processing time, processes stopped at “x” days, number of processes per 
issue/matter”. It seems that those targets really influence the behavior of judges. According to 
interviewee 5 “the judge is under constant pressure from the National Council of Justice. That 
Council is the ‘sword of Damocles’ with the Court, and the Court with the judge. The judge 
is stressed about those goals”. According to respondent 2:  
Every month we follow the targets. It was difficult to reach the goal last month 
because the number of new cases filed was higher than usual. The team had to work 
twice as hard, so that we could reach the goal. 
A state judge (respondent 6) showed how he was aware of his performance targets: “I know 
exactly how my goals are … The Comptroller’s Office puts them on the intranet and has a 
giant screen where he tracks all offices with graphics. Big Brother, so to speak”. 
The pivotal role played by the National Council of Justice (CNJ) should be 
highlighted. The CNJ seems to promote coercive isomorphism on courts. Coercive 
isomorphism is a mechanism through which one organization exerts formal and informal 
pressure on other organizations leading them to become increasingly similar (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). Due to CNJ’s pressure, Brazilian courts are using similar electronic systems 
and similar performance indicators and targets. Factors belonging to the organizational 





Table 4.3 10 
Organizational Factors Affecting Court Disposition Time 
Category Factor 
Effect: 
Before the case 
(Judicialization) 
During the case 
(Judgement) 




Quantity and quality of judges  X X 
Quantity and quality of 
assistants  X X 
Technology 
Software  X X 
Hardware and infrastructure  X X 
Management 
Performance indicators  X X 
Control  X X 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This paper investigated factors affecting court dispositional time in civil cases in 
Brazil. Research data generated a list of 28 factors related to the phenomenon, clustered in 
three basic dimensions: institutional, organizational, and jurisdictional. These results, 
although related do one country, push the knowledge upon the theme, contributing to 
improvements in policies and strategies about administration of justice. In countries facing 
similar problems, politicians and policy makers should adopt a comprehensive perspective, 
including reforms that addresses issues aggregated in the different dimensions debated above, 
with a special focus on institutional factors. 
Institutional factors (legal, cultural and social) seem to play a major role before the 
case (judicialization), during the case (judgement) and after the case (enforcement). The 
institutional design of Brazilian judicial system generates a phenomenon that can be defined 
as “judicial universalism”, the idea that Brazilian courts should decide all universe of disputes 
that arise in society and to perform a universe of duties that go beyond the classic 
jurisdictional functions. 
Brazilian judicial system seems to have low ability to select cases considered relevant 
from a social point of view (low external selectivity of cases). The culture of litigation 
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present in the society combined with high number of lawyers promote de phenomena of 
judicialization. Instead of filtering which disputes are relevant, legal rules simply eliminate 
litigation costs and risks. In this sense, judicial litigation represents just possible benefits to 
the plaintiff, which have strong economic incentives to bring any suit for courts, including 
frivolous suits. As a consequence, too many disputes are judicialized. For each of those cases, 
courts must perform duties that are not restricted to deciding the dispute (low selectivity of 
duties). Among duties that have low or no relation with jurisdictional functions are 
responsibilities as collecting evidence, locating debtors and assets, and enforcing tax cases.  
Besides the institutional factors enclosed in the concept of judicial universalism, other 
institutional factors seem to form the phenomena of judicial aversion, the fear or resistance to 
comply with judicial decisions. Litigants have many opportunities to challenge judicial 
decisions. The legal system has multiple appeals in multiple instances, all appeals are a right 
of the appellant and no court has discretionary power to decide which cases deserve revision, 
not even Brazilian Supreme Court (low internal selectivity of cases). Some parties resist in 
good faith, because they think they should have won the case (Culture of Nonconformity). 
However, there is a kind of resistance based on bad faith, when the losing party knows that 
judicial decision is correct, but still try to avoid its enforcement (Culture of Trickery). This 
trickery behavior is reinforced by legal rules and judicial benevolence that protect the debtors 
from patrimonial constriction. Judicial aversion is also characterized by the low capacity of 
the system to punish wrong behavior appropriately (lack of punitive damage), which would 
generate a deterrent effect and avoid the emergence of disputes. 
Judicial universalism and judicial aversion are opposite phenomena. On the one hand, 
a universe of cases and duties should be handled by courts. Society seem to trust in the 
judicial system. On the other hand, judicial decisions are challenged, and many barriers are 
created to make judicial decisions effective. Society seem to distrust the judicial system. This 
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paradox transformed the judicial system in a pachyderm, a system that is too large and too 
slow, unable to handle cases in a timely fashion. Both judicial universalism and judicial 
aversion are institutional phenomena. Institutional factors seem to have the most negative 
impact on court celerity. 
Although smaller, jurisdictional factors also seem to increase case disposition time. It 
appears that Brazilian courts have not yet learned how to operate a system of binding 
precedents, causing jurisprudential instability. This instability can be either vertical, when 
judges do not follow precedents defined by superior courts, or horizontal, when the court do 
not follow its own precedent. Judicial procrastination, the resistance of judges to decide 
polemic or complex cases, seems to have a limited effect on case disposition time, because it 
seems restricted to some judges or to some specific cases.  
In contrast with institutional and jurisdictional factors, the organizational factors seem 
to have a positive impact on the pace of cases. The research points out that federal and state 
courts are in different stages of organizational development. While technological 
infrastructure, the quantity of judges and the quantity and quality of judicial assistants were 
appointed as problems in state courts, they were not appointed as problems in federal courts. 
However, organizational differences between courts seem to be reducing due to the work 
promoted by the National Council of Justice, which created national performance indicators 
and encouraged an expansion in the use of electronic systems. 
Future studies may focus on comparative analysis including countries that follow both 
civil law and common law approaches. Another research opportunity may be collecting the 
perception of the users of the judicial system, as citizens, businesses, and government. 
Finally, a quantitative approach to investigate the duration of cases may be also useful to 
achieve results that could be generalized to a large number of countries. 
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5 Factors Affecting Judgements and Enforcements: Evidence from Brazilian Labor 
Courts 
Abstract 
Court performance has increasingly become the object of empirical research, but factors 
impacting the enforcement of judicial decisions have not been explored yet. Judicial 
decisions would have little social value if they were not enforced. This study investigates 
which factors impact the number of resolved cases in the judgement and in the enforcement 
stages of Brazilian first instance labor courts. Two regression techniques are applied 
(Ordinary Least Squares and Fixed Effects) and their results are compared and discussed. On 
the one hand, it was found that the impact of pending cases on court output seems to be much 
higher in the enforcement stage than in the judgement stage. On the other hand, it was found 
that the impact of technology on the number of resolved cases is small but significant during 
the judgement stage but non-significant in the enforcement stage. Contrary to previous 
empirical research, this study found that number of judges have a substantial impact on court 
output, at least as strong as the impact of caseload. The number of new cases brought to 
courts seems to have just a moderate effect on the number of resolved cases. The public 
policy implications of these findings are debated. 
Keywords: court output, judgement, enforcement, caseload, judges 
5.1 Introduction 
The performance of courts has an important impact on economic and social 
development. For this reason, judicial performance has increasingly become the subject of 
empirical scrutiny. Some studies focused on the court level in order to explain which factors 
impact court output as a whole (e.g., Beenstock & Haitovsky 2004, Rosales-López 2008; 
Dimitrova Grajzl et al. 2012; Dimitrova-Grajzl et. al., 2016). Other studies have investigated 
if factors affecting court output vary with some type of court office, as civil, criminal or 
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mixed offices (Gomes et al., 2017), or according to case procedural category, as cases 
requiring full-trial or just simplified procedures (Bełdowski et al., 2020). So far, however, no 
attention has been paid to the distinction between factors affecting judicial deliberation and 
judicial enforcement. 
Judicial deliberation and judicial enforcement seem to have different natures. In 
judicial deliberation, the judge hears parties and witnesses, analyzes evidences brought by 
both sides and the norms applicable to the case. At this stage, substantive legal analysis is 
done, and the goal is to reach a judicial decision. In judicial enforcement, the goal is to 
enforce the judicial decision. Courts take procedural and administrative steps – sometimes 
using and supervising structures of the Executive branch—to make the judicial decision 
effective, like imposing restrictions on debtor’s assets and freezing checking accounts. The 
resources, skills and conditions necessary to reach a judicial decision may be different from 
those affecting its enforcement. 
Courts would have little social and economic value if their decisions were not 
enforced. Enforcement is particularly important as a primary economic function of the courts 
(Fix-Fierro, 2003). Deficiencies in court enforcement affect firms access to finance and 
investments (Ponticelli & Alencar, 2016), impact how firms organize production (Boehm and 
Oberfield, 2018), and postpone the delivery of public works (Coviello et. al., 2013). 
According to the European Court of Human Rights—ECRH, States have a positive obligation 
to organize a system to enforce judicial decisions and this system should be effective both in 
law and in practice (ECHR, 2019). The non-enforcement of court decisions is the second 
main reason cited by applicants before the ECHR regarding the Article 6 of European 
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Convention of Human Rights4 and many European countries have established mechanisms to 
avoid the non-enforcement of judicial decisions (CEPEJ, 2018). 
Although non-negligible empirical research has been carried out on court performance 
(Voigt, 2016), factors impacting specific procedural stages (judgement or enforcement) remain 
unexplored. Empirical studies addressing this question may provide subsidies to more refined 
court administration strategies. To fill in this gap in the literature, this research investigates which 
factors impact the number of cases ended both in the judgement stage and in the enforcement 
stage. 
Brazilian labor courts offer a proper research opportunity to this kind of investigation. 
First, the Brazilian judicial system has separate and distinct procedural stages for the 
judgment of cases and for the enforcement of judicial decisions. This distinction enables the 
collection of data directly related to each stage. Second, Brazilian labor courts are fully 
specialized in issue and all enforcements follow the same procedure. Any research finding 
may be directly related to this type of case and enforcement procedure. Other kind of 
Brazilian courts, as state and federal courts, for example, have jurisdiction over many 
different issues (e.g., civil, criminal, tax) and enforcements follow different procedures (civil, 
criminal and tax cases have their own enforcement procedure), which could blur the analysis. 
 The contribution of this paper to the existing literature is three-fold. First, it 
distinguishes court performance by procedural stage (judgement and enforcement), a 
dimension that has not been explored by empirical studies yet. Second, it is focused on labor 
courts, one type of court that was barely analyzed by previous studies investigating 
determinants of court output. Third, it investigates court output in Brazil, a developing Latin 
America continental country. Despite the growing literature on judicial performance, rigorous 
                                                          
4 Article 6: In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law… 
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research on court efficiency in developing countries remains scarce (Voigt, 2016). Previous 
international publication on this topic was concentrated in Europe and Asia, as papers 
analyzing court output in Spain (Rosales-López 2008), Slovenia (Dimitrova Grajzl et al. 
2012), Bulgaria (Dimitrova-Grajzl et. al., 2016), Poland (Bełdowski et al., 2020), Israel 
(Beenstock & Haitovsky, 2004) and Nepal (Grajzl & Silwal, 2020). Moreover, Brazilian 
population (208 million inhabitants) and geographical area (8.5 million of Km2) are higher 
than all those countries together. The effect of explanatory variables in a country with these 
characteristics may be different from those found in previous studies, as court administration 
face higher and more complex managerial challenges. Analyzing court output in other parts 
of the world and in continental countries would enrich current knowledge about court 
performance. 
5.2 Theoretical Background 
A wide range of explanatory variables have been examined by empirical studies in 
order to explain court performance in general and court output in particular. Among those 
exploratory variables, court caseload, the number of judges, the number of judicial assistants, 
expenses in technology and budgetary issues have been specially examined. 
Court caseload seems to have a strong relation with judicial output. Studies suggest a 
positive impact of caseload on court output, but the size of the impact has some variation. A 
study undertaken in Israel showed that the number of decided cases per judge varies directly 
(approx. one-to-one) with the caseload per judge (Beenstock & Haitovsky, 2004). In 
Slovenian first instance courts, after controlling for endogeneity problems, researchers 
detected that a 10% increase in judicial caseload produces a more than 17.6% increase in the 
volume of decided cases (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., 2012). An analogous investigation 
concluded that case disposition in Bulgarian courts is primarily driven by demand for court 
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services (approx. one-to-one) in both large and small district courts (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., 
2016). 
In other countries, the effect of caseload on court production was lower. In Nepal, it 
was found that a 10% increase in court’s caseload leads to an 8.8–9.2% increase in the 
volume of resolved cases (Grajzl & Silwal, 2020). In Spain, a 10% increase in workload of 
first instance courts produces a 3% increase in judicial output (Rosales-Lopez, 2008). In 
Brazil the impact of caseload on the number of decisions depends on the specialization of the 
judicial office (Gomes et al., 2017). In that country, a 10% increase in caseload produces an 
increase of 3.5% in criminal offices, of 0.8% in civil offices and of 6.1% in mixed offices. 
Almost all studies cited above analyzed the impact of caseload on court output, 
considering caseload as the sum of new cases filed and pending cases. Surprisingly, only 
Beenstock and Haitovsky (2004) and Bełdowski et al., (2020) have investigated the specific 
effects of new cases and pending cases on court output. In other words, the precise impact of 
new cases on court output as well as the precise impact of pending cases on court output are 
questions barely addressed by empirical literature. Disentangling these factors allows a 
deeper understanding of the impact of court demand on court supply. 
In the Beenstock and Haitovsky (2004) study both variables (new cases and pending 
cases) had a significant impact on court output, but the effect of the number of new cases 
filed during the year was much stronger (between 0.741 and 0.932 depending on the court) 
than the impact of pending cases at the beginning of the year (between –0.014 and 0.155 
depending on the court). After using instrumental variables to address reverse causality, 
Bełdowski et al. (2020) found that an increase of 10% in the number of new cases produces a 
7.5% increase in the total number of decided cases, a result that remains strong regardless of 
case category (full-trial, writ-of-payment and non-litigious cases). In this study, pending 
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cases have no impact on the total number of judicial decisions, having a substantial and 
significant impact just in the very limited group of non-litigious cases. 
The impact of the number of judges on court output was studied by several scholars. 
Intuition says that increasing the number of judges would increase the number of judicial 
decisions, however, empirical studies have challenged this view. A groundbreaking study done in 
Israel showed that the number of case decisions is independent of the number of judges serving in 
a court (Beenstock & Haitovsky, 2004). According to the authors, incumbent judges decide fewer 
cases when new judges are appointed because caseload pressure (caseload per judge) decreases. 
The productivity of judges is endogenous to such an extent that changes in the number of judges 
are offset by countervailing changes in productivity, such that “the total dispositions by court are 
not sensitive to the size of the bench” (Beenstock & Haitovsky, 2004, p. 365). 
A study aiming to evaluate the impact of judges on court output undertaken in 
Slovenia raised important methodological questions (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., 2012). An 
increase in the number of judges have a significant but small effect in the number of decided 
cases when Pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) and Fixed Effects (FE) approaches were 
used. However, when the authors applied an instrumental variable approach to address 
possible reverse causality between both judicial staffing and caseload on the one hand and the 
number of resolved cases on the other, the significance of the effect of judges on judicial 
output disappeared. Researchers found a more complex phenomena in Bulgaria. While the 
number of judges does not impact the number of judicial decisions in large district courts, it 
has a (modest) positive effect in small district courts even after reverse causality issues are 
addressed (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., 2016). Also using instrumental variables, a study in 
Poland found no effect of judges on court output of commercial courts, except for full trials, 
in which a 10% increase in the number of judges produces a 3% increase in the number of 
decided cases (Bełdowski et al., 2020). 
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Empirical studies usually find a positive effect of support staff on judicial 
performance. The size of the staff in civil first instance courts seems to have some impact on 
court output in Spain, where an increase of 10% in the size of judicial employees produces a 
6.2% increase in judicial output (Rosalez-Lopez, 2008). In Greece, it was found evidence, 
especially among court of appeals and higher civil courts of first degree, that when the ratio 
of employees to total cases introduced worsens, the time needed to dispose cases also 
worsens (Mitsopoulos & Pelagidis, 2007). In Brazil, a research using panel data from 
Brazilian State Courts found a positive and statistically significant relationship between the 
number of assistants and court productivity (Gomes et al., 2016). 
It is at least curious that empirical research point to a positive impact of the number of 
judicial assistants on court performance while the impact of the number of judges seems to be 
non-significant or very limited. One possible explanation for that may be the use of different 
and perhaps more rigorous methodology to measure the impact of judges. Studies about the 
impact of judicial assistants on court performance have not addressed the issue of reverse 
causality, for example. The apparent contradiction between the impact of judicial assistants and 
judges on judicial performance point to the need of more meticulous empirical analysis on the 
subject. 
The impact of technology on court performance is less studied and more 
controversial. Theoretically, technological improvements should enhance court performance 
because they boost the ability to manage the caseload, to write opinions and to search 
reported cases on-line. In a research undertaken in Argentina and Venezuela, it was found 
that the higher the use of technology, the faster the case disposition time is (Buscaglia & 
Ulen, 1997). Assessing the impact of information technology on the efficiency and quality of 
justice has been one of the tasks entrusted to the European Commission for the Efficiency of 
Justice (CEPEJ, 2018). The use of technology had no significant effect on the number of 
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resolved cases in a research done in 27 countries in Europe (Deyneli, 2012). This lack of 
impact was confirmed by an official study that “notably highlighted the lack of a clear 
correlation between the level of financial investment in IT and the efficiency indicators” in 
the European countries (CEPEJ, 2018, p. 211). Only one study involving European countries 
found a statistically significant effect of technology budget on court performance, but the 
effect was small in magnitude (Lorenzani & Ludici, 2014). 
The budget of the court is another variable that received some attention from those 
researching judicial performance. A research using data from 47 European countries 
concluded that budget has a highly significantly negative impact on court resolution rate 
(Voigt & El-Bialy, 2014). According to the authors, “more money does not necessarily buy a 
better—or more efficient—judiciary” (p. 300). This is the same conclusion reached by 
Buscaglia and Dakolias (1999), to whom adding general resources to the budget does not 
affect case disposition time. These authors, however, found that an increase in investment 
(capital budget resources) has the effect of increasing the proportion of disposals per 
employee and judge, and thereby reducing the time to disposition. 
5.3 Data and Method 
This research is focused on the Brazilian labor courts, one of the five segments of 
Brazilian judicial system (other segments are state courts, federal courts, electoral courts and 
military courts). Labor courts are responsible for deciding all cases involving labor relations, 
including cases filed against private persons, business, and governments. Usually labor cases 
are filed by employees demanding payments from their former employers, but it also includes 
cases requiring moral damages connected to labor relations and decision on strikes. Brazil has 
27 states and 24 labor courts. Each court is responsible for decisions in first and second instance. 
The Superior Labor Court is the third instance, which may be accessed to discuss legal issues, but 
not factual matters. 
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Labor courts represent an important part of the Brazilian judicial system. In the first 
instance, there are 3.077 labor judges, which corresponds to 19.8% of first instance judges in 
the country (CNJ, 2020). Brazilian labor relations are highly judicialized. In 2019, a total of 
1.814.400 new cases were filed in labor courts (CNJ, 2020), which means a ratio of 0.86 new 
cases per 100 inhabitants. This ratio is higher than in all the 30 European countries that 
reported specific data about labor cases to the European Commission for the Efficiency of 
Justice (CEPEJ, 2018). According to the CEPEJ, in 2016 the level of new labor cases per 100 
inhabitants was lower than 0.1 in 23 European countries and the country with the highest rate 
was Serbia, with 0.47 new cases per 100 inhabitants. 
When a new labor case is filed, it is decided by a labor office in the first instance. If 
parties do not agree with this first instance judgement, cases may be appealed until reaching a 
final judgement. If the final judicial decision favors the employee, the employer should make a 
voluntary payment. When voluntary payment is not made, judicial enforcement proceedings are 
initiated before the first instance labor office that originally decided the case. At this moment, 
labor judges may order different patrimonial constrictions, freezing debtor’s assets such as 
checking accounts, automobiles, or real estate properties (enforcement proceedings are 
conducted exclusively by first instance offices). In 2019, a total of BRL 3.7 billion 
(approximately USD 0.6 billion) in voluntary payments were made after judgements in the first 
instance and BRL 12.5 billion (approximately. USD 2.3 billion) were payed after enforcement 
proceedings (Tribunal Superior do Trabalho [TST], 2020).  
All the data was collected from the public dataset of the National Council of Justice 
(CNJ) covering an eight-year period, from 2012 to 2019. The data was collected from all 24 
labor courts, resulting in 192 court-year observations. The collection of data about new cases 
(filed during the year), resolved cases (cases ended during the year) and pending cases (as 
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recorded at the end of the year) was done by procedural stage (judgment and enforcement), 
specifically in the first instance. 
Data about the number of judges and legal assistants refers only to those who work 
directly in the first instance, considering the number at the end of each year in each court. 
Legal assistants are permanent public civil servants graduated in law whose primary duty is 
to assist judges in writing the draft of judicial decisions. The data did not allow a 
measurement of the exact time judges and legal assistants spent on cases of different stages. 
Therefore, data on the number of judges and legal assistants working at first instance labor 
offices was used, the same approach applied by Bełdowski et al. (2020). Spending on 
acquisitions in technology, on the maintenance of technological infrastructure, and on 
investments in general were collected by labor court (first and second instance combined). It 
is supposed that those three variables are strongly connected to the first instance, as 85% of 
the judges and 82% of pending cases are concentrated on this level.  
Data related to the judgement stage is presented in Figure 5.1.  
Figure 5.1 3 












All variables show an upward trend until 2015. Due to a legal reform implemented at 
the end of 2017, the number of new cases filed faced a sharp decrease, falling from 2.6 
million cases in 2017 to 1.7 million cases in 2018. In this year, the difference between the 
number of resolved cases and the number of new cases was the highest in the historical 
series, causing an intense decrease in the backlog (number of pending cases). 
Data related to the enforcement stage is presented in Figure 5.2. Contrary to the 
judgment phase, the number of new cases, resolved cases and pending cases in the 
enforcement stage was not affected by the labor legal reform. In the enforcement stage, the 
level of pending cases is much higher than the level of new or resolved cases, which are very 
close to each other and relatively stable along the period. Figure 5.3 illustrates the data of all 
first instance cases, combining judgement and enforcement stages. As the volume of cases in 
the judgement stage is higher than the volume in the enforcement stage, the trajectory of new, 
pending and resolved cases in Figure 5.3 is similar to the one present in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.2 4 













The panel structure of the data is similar to the one adopted by Beenstock and Haitovsky 
(2004) and by Dimitrova Grajzl et al. (2012). The unit of observation is a court in a given 
year. Table 5.1 gives precise definitions to the variables tested in the analysis and Table 5.2 
presents the descriptive statistics. 
Figure 5.3 






Variable Type Description 
Resolved Dependent Number of cases ended during the year 
New/judge Independent Number of new cases filed during the year per judge 
Pending/judge Independent Number of pending cases at the beginning of the year per judge 
Judges Independent Number of judges 
Staff/judge Independent Number of legal assistants per judge 
Tech/judge Independent Total expenses with technology (acquisition + maintenance) per judge  
Capital/judge Independent Total expenses in capital resources per judge 





Table 5.2 12 
Summary Statistics 
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Resolved Cases       
Judgement 192 108 080.2 117 085.5 18 330 622 891 
Enforcement 192 36 783.3 42 028.3 1 925 265 749 
All 
 
192 144 863.5 152 605.6 23 895 740 816 
New Cases / Judge      
Judgement 192 728.0 195.3 315.0 1 212.2 
Enforcement 192 256.7 92.2 94.7 758.8 
All 
 
192 984.7 246.0 459.9 1 885.2 
Pending Cases / Judge      
Judgement 192 572.1 276.1 73.7 1 321.0 
Enforcement 192 711.5 305.5 76.3 1 680.6 
All 
 
192 1 283.6 481.3 433.2 2 529.4 
Judges 192 125.7 106.6 22 525 
Staff / Judge 192 7.2 1.1 4.3 10.2 
Tech / Judge 192 68 817.0 40 086.6 3 621.5 294 446.0 
Capital / Judge 192 169 226.2 241 043.7 1 525.9 2 003 182.0 
 
All the variables were transformed with (natural) logs to smooth out the effect of size 
differences among courts and to estimate how much a fixed percentage change in an 
independent variable would impact court output, the same procedure adopted by similar 
investigations (e.g., Beenstock & Haitovsky, 2004; Rosales-Lopez, 2008; Dimitrova-Grajzl 
et. al., 2012). Data investigation was conducted through two regression methods. The 
traditional pooled Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression provides a first estimation and 
controls for year fixed effects. As the independent variables may be correlated with some 
unobserved court-level characteristic, causing pooled OLS to be biased, an estimation based 
on two-way fixed effects (FE) was applied, controlling for year and court fixed effects. This 
is the same approach used by other studies (Dimitrova-Grajzl et. al., 2012) to address the 
problem.  
Aiming to check if the statistical design described above was appropriate for this 
study, an array of assumptions was tested. To verify the convenience of using the fixed 
effects model in addition to the OLS model, two tests were run: the Lagrange Multiplier Test 
– (Breusch-Pagan) for balanced panels (p-value = 0.0003486) and the F test for two-ways 
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effects (p-value < 2.2e-16). Both rejected the null hypothesis of no panel effect. To verify if 
the two-way fixed effects model is more suitable than individual effects, other two tests were 
applied: F test for individual effects. (p-value = 1.09e-06) and Lagrange Multiplier Test-time 
effects (Breush-Pagan) (p-value < 2.2e-16). Both tests suggest significant time-fixed effects, 
not just individual fixed effects. For the hypothesis of cross-sectional dependence, the 
Pesaran CD test for cross-sectional dependence in panels was applied. With the p-value of 
0.1369, the null hypothesis of cross-sectional dependence was rejected. The homoskedasticity 
is the null hypothesis of the Studentized Breusch-Pagan test. With a p-value of 0.5583, it was 
not rejected.  
Finally, the VIF (Variance Inflation Factors) quantifies the severity of 
multicollinearity. If VIF is calculated with all independent variables in absolute number, i.e., 
with no division by number of judges, there is some indication of multicollinearity (New 
Cases: 14.97; Pending Cases: 7.34; Staff: 13.00; Tech: 2.76; Capital: 1.50). However, if all 
these variables are normalized by the number of judges, the VIF of each variable reach an 
appropriate level (New Cases: 1.38; Pending Cases: 1.33; Staff: 1.37; Tech: 1.45; Capital: 
1.31; Judges: 1.37). Accordingly, independent variables were normalized by the number of 
judges (expect for the number of judges itself). Equation 1 shows the pooled OLS model and 
Equation 2 shows the Fixed Effect model: 
 
ln (Resolvedit) = α + β1 ln(Newit/Judgeit) + β2 ln(Pendingit/Judgeit) + β3 ln(Judgesit)+           (1) 
      β4 ln(Staffit/Judgeit) + β5 ln(Techit//Judgeit) + β6 ln(Capitalit//Judgeit) + γt + εit 
 
ln (Resolvedit) = α + β1 ln(Newit/Judgeit) + β2 ln(Pendingit/Judgeit) + β3 ln(Judgesit)+           (2) 





In Equation 1, i = 1, 2, …, 24 identifies the court; t = 1, 2, …, 8 identifies the time 
period (between 2012 and 2019); the year dummies γt control for any unobservable factors 
that influence the number of resolved cases of all labor courts but vary across years, such as 
reform of the judicial system; εi is the error term. The description of Equation 1 applies for 
Equation 2, which also has a court fixed effects μi controlling for all court-level, time-
invariant factors that may affect court output. 
5.4 Results and Discussion 
The coefficients of Equations 1 and 2 were estimated for all labor cases combined, as well as 
separately for judgement and enforcement. This distinction is key to investigating differences 
between the impact of explanatory variables on the number of resolved cases. Table 5.3 
reports the results of both pooled OLS model (Equation 1) and FE model (Equation 2) 
described in the previous section.  
Table 5.3 13 
Regression Results — Pooled OLS and Two-way Fixed Effects 
Dependent Variable: Log Resolved Cases 
 OLS  Fixed Effects 
 Judgement Enforcement All  Judgement Enforcement All 
















































































Observations 192 192 192  192 192 192 
R² 0.975 0.907 0.978  0.277 0.324 0.251 
F Statistic 1,201.95*** 
(df = 6; 185) 
300.44*** 
(df = 6; 185) 
1,393.81*** 
(df = 6; 185) 
 9.89*** 
(df = 6; 155) 
12.38*** 
(df = 6; 155) 
8.65*** 
(df = 6; 155) 
Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Numbers in parentheses denote standard errors.  
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The result of the OLS model suggest that number of judges have a strong impact on 
the number of resolved cases in Brazilian labor courts. Table 13 shows a relation of one-to-
one between the number of judges and the number of resolved cases, regardless of the 
procedural stage. The impact of new cases per judge on the number of resolved cases is high, 
producing similar impacts on both procedural stages. If the number of new cases increases 
10%, the number of resolved cases would increase 6.47% in the judgement stage and 6.95% 
in the enforcement stage. The impact of pending cases per judge on the number of resolved 
cases is lower and depend on the procedural stage. A 10% in the number of pending cases 
would increase the number of judgements in 1.39%, and the number of enforcements in 
2.61%. The number of judicial staff per judge and the investment in capital per judge were 
not significant. However, expenses with technology per judge had a small but significant 
positive effect on the number of resolved cases, especially on the enforcement stage. 
The FE model show some different results. The impact of the number of judges on the 
number of resolved cases remains high and significant, but the coefficients are slightly lower 
than in the pooled OLS model. While the impact of the new cases per judge was similar 
across both models, the impact of pending cases per judge has decreased in the judgement 
stage and increased in the enforcement stage. It should be noted how the impact of pending 
cases is noticeably higher in the enforcement stage (0.302) than in the judgement stage 
(0.080), which shows the importance of segregating the data between those two different 
procedural stages. 
As explained in the previous section, FE models are able to address some endogeneity 
problems. Accordingly, FE models were considered less biased than OLS models by previous 
empirical literature (e.g., Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., 2012; Bełdowski et al., 2020). For this 
reason and aiming to promote the highest possible comparability across different studies, the 
following comments compare the results of FE models found in this study with the results of 
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FE models found in previous studies (without court-specific time trends). Besides that, the 
following comparisons will consider just studies that used panel data and included the 
number of judges and caseload in the regression model, the same empirical strategy applied 
in this research. 
The impact of the number of judges on the number of resolved cases found by this 
study is much stronger than the impact found by analogous previous research. If the number 
of judges in Brazilian first instance courts increases 10%, the number of resolved cases would 
increase 7.95% in general, 8.68% in the judgment stage and 7.82% in the enforcement stage 
(the impact in the enforcement stage is significant just under the 0.10 level). Some earlier 
studies concluded that the number of judges produces low impact on court output, i.e., 
increasing the number of judges in 10% would increase court output in 2% or less 
(Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., 2012; Grajzl & Silwal, 2020; Bełdowski et al., 2020). Other studies 
concluded that increasing the number of judges would produces no impact at all (Beenstock 
& Haitovsky, 2004; Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., 2016). Table 5.4 makes clear how the results 
found in this study are different from the results found in precedent studies. 
One of the few studies that found some relation between number of judges and court 
output was undertaken in Nepal (Grajzl & Silwal, 2020), where an increase of 10% in the 
number of judges would lead to an increase in 1.9% in the number of resolved cases. 
According to the authors, this result may reflect the exceptional scarcity of court resources in 
the country, where any additional judge would produce a moderate impact on court output. 
Brazilian courts face exactly the opposite situation of their Nepalese counterparts in terms of 
courts resources. Brazilian judicial system consumes 1.3% of the country’s GDP, more 
expensive than several countries, as German courts (0.32% of GDP), Italian courts (0.19% of 
GDP) or American courts (0.14% of GDP) (Da Ros, 2015). Even in this resource-abundant 
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scenario, increasing the number of judges seems to produce a major impact on the number of 
resolved cases. 
Table 5.414 
Impact of Judges on The Number of Resolved Cases in Brazil and Other Selected 
Countries (Two-way Fixed Effects—FE) 
Study Country and Court Impact of Judges - FE 
This Study Brazil (first-instance labor courts)  
 All cases    0.795*** (0.189) 
 Judgement stage    0.868*** (0.192) 
 Enforcement stage    0.782* (0.424) 
Beenstock & Haitovsky (2004) Israel  
 High Court − 0.21** (0.137) 
 District Court    0.033** (0.057) 
 Magistrate Court    0.129** (0.044) 
Dimitrova-Grajzl et al. (2012) Slovenia  
 District courts − 0.07 (0.10) 
 Local courts    0.13* (0.06) 
Dimitrova-Grajzl et al. (2016) Bulgaria  
 Large district courts    0.0479 (0.0754) 
 Small district courts    0.0295 (0.0326) 
Grajzl & Silwal (2020) Nepal  
 District courts    0.1896*** (0.0883) 
Bełdowski et al. (2020) 
Poland (first-instance commercial courts)  
All cases    0.059*** (0.02) 
 Cases requiring full trial    0.20*** (0.03) 
 Writ-of-payment    0.025 (0.02) 
 Non litigious cases − 0.014 (0.13) 
Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Numbers in parentheses denote standard errors.  
 
Contrary to previous studies, which concluded that caseload was the main factor 
impacting the number of resolved cases, this research points that the number of judges is at 
least as important as the caseload for court output. This study confirms the general idea that 
variations in the caseload produces an important effect on court output. Table 5.5 compares 







 Table 5.5 15 
Impact of Caseload on The Number of Resolved Cases in Brazil and Other Selected 
Countries (Two-way Fixed Effects—FE) 
 
Study Country and Court New Pending Caseload 
This Study Brazil (labor courts)    
 All cases 0.586*** (0.093) 0.125*** (0.045) - 
 Judgement stage 0.649*** (0.105) 0.080*** (0.029) - 
  Enforcement stage 0.701*** (0.091) 0.302*** (0.085) - 
Beenstock & Haitovsky 
(2004) 
Israel    
High Court 0.932** (0.072) 0.0056** (0.018) - 
 District Court 0.805** (0.035) 0.155** (0.026) - 
 Magistrate Court 0.741** (0.042) 0.125** (0.026) - 
Dimitrova-Grajzl et al. 
(2012) 
Slovenia    
District courts - - 1.06*** (0.09) 
 Local courts - - 0.60*** (0.09) 
Dimitrova-Grajzl et al. 
(2016) 
Bulgaria    
Large district courts - - 1.0264*** (0.0370) 
 Small district courts - - 1.0049*** (0.0237) 
Grajzl & Silwal (2020) Nepal    
 District courts - - 1.0072*** (0.0883) 
Bełdowski et al. (2020) Poland (commercial courts)    
All cases 0.94*** (0.04) 0.035*** (0.01) - 
Cases with full trial 0.76*** (0.03) 0.080*** (0.02) - 
 Writ-of-payment 0.96*** (0.03) 0.040*** (0.01) - 
 Non litigious cases 0.57*** (0.05) 0.50*** (0.04) - 
Note: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Numbers in parentheses denote standard errors.  
 
Some studies analyzed how caseload as a whole (combination of new cases and 
pending cases) may impact court output (Dimitrova-Grajzl et al., 2012; Dimitrova-Grajzl et 
al., 2016; Grajzl & Silwal, 2020). Those studies found a significative relation of one-to-one 
between variations in the caseload and variations in the number of resolved cases, pointing 
that caseload has a prevailing impact on the output of the courts surveyed. The impact of 
caseload in small courts in Slovenia also has a significant and strong impact on the number of 
resolved cases, but the size of the effect is relatively lower (0.60). 
Two studies investigated the specific impact of new cases and pending cases on the 
number of resolved cases (Beenstock & Haitovsky, 2004; Bełdowski et al., 2020). The 
combination of the coefficients of new cases and pending cases is approximately unity, 
“implying that completions are almost proportionate to the caseload” (Beenstock & 
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Haitovsky, 2004, p. 364). The results found by Bełdowski et al., (2020) are astonishingly 
similar. Those two studies coincide in another aspect. They point that, in fact, the dominant 
factor impacting court output is the number of new cases, because the size of the impact of 
this variable (between 0.741 and 0.96) is multiple times higher than the size of the number of 
pending cases (between 0.0056 and 0.155)5. In view of the five studies described above, it 
can be said that court output would vary directly with the caseload and specifically with the 
number of new cases brought to court. 
The underlying explanation for this phenomenon is that judges react to economic 
incentives in the same way everybody does (Posner, 1993). If the pressure (caseload per 
judge) increases, judicial productivity increases. If pressure decreases, judicial productivity 
decreases. “The positive association between productivity and caseload holds both when the 
system is expanding and when it is contracting” (Beenstock & Haitovsky, 2004, p. 360). 
Considering that (i) court output would vary almost directly with the number of new cases 
filed and (ii) this relation holds true when the system is expanding or contracting, one might 
conclude that any reforms reducing court demand would probably have few or even no effect 
on court backlog. As the number of new cases filed would decrease, pressure over judges 
(caseload per judge) would decrease. As a consequence, judges would resolve a lower 
number of cases and the backlog would be barely touched. The reaction of judges to 
workload would undermine the expected positive consequences of the legal reform. 
However, it seems that Brazilian first instance labor courts are less driven by judicial 
demand than courts in other countries. The impact of new cases brought to courts, captured 
by the number of new cases in the judgement phase (0.649), is lower than the impact found in 
                                                          
5 One exception may be the similar impact of new cases (0.57) and pending cases (0.50) in non-litigious cases in 
Poland (Bełdowski et al., 2020). However, considering that those cases are not typical judicial cases, in the 
sense that there is no dispute to be resolved, and that they represent just 0.07% of the cases in the study, those 
cases were not considered in this analysis. 
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previous studies investigating this phenomenon. This point may have important public policy 
implications. It means that the number of judgements in Brazilian first instance labor courts is 
not so sensitive to variations in the number of new cases filed. In this scenario, legal reforms 
designed to reduce court demand would have a real impact on case backlog, reducing court 
congestion and case disposition time. 
The Brazilian legal reform implemented in the end of 2017 seems to reflect this 
scenario. As shown in Figure 3, the number of new cases brought to court decreased 34% 
after the reform, falling from 2.6 million cases in 2017 to 1.7 million cases in 2018. In the 
same period, the number of resolved cases in the judgement stage felt just 10%, from 2.9 
million to 2.6 million. The numbers per judge are even more clear. While caseload pressure 
in the judgment stage (number of new filed cases per judge) felt 32.9%, judicial productivity 
(number of judgements per judge) felt just 8.2%. 
Contrary to law and economics approach that judges would use this time for leisure 
(Posner, 1993) and to the previous empirical studies suggesting that judicial productivity 
would have fallen approximately in the same proportion of court demand, most of extra time 
that judges spared after the reform was used to address the case backlog. Indeed, the number 
of pending cases in the judgement stage fell from 2.3 million at the end of 2017 to 1.6 million 
at the end of 2018, i.e., a backlog reduction of 31% in just one year, a remarkable 
achievement. 
The five studies debated above and shown in tables 14 and 15 have not tested the 
impact of judicial staff on court output. As described in section 3, past empirical studies 
found a positive influence of the number of judicial staff on court performance. One more 
time the findings of the present research are contrary to previous empirical results. The 
impact of the number of judicial staff on the number of resolved cases was non-significant in 
all tested scenarios (judgement stage, enforcement stage and all cases), regardless of the 
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method adopted (OLS or FE). As studies investigating the impact of judicial staff on court 
performance have adopted different methods, accurate comparisons as those made to the 
number of judges and caseload are not possible. 
The impact of technology on court output was small but significant in the judgement 
stage. According to the FE model, a 10% increase in technology expenses per judge would 
increase the number of resolved cases in 0.32%. Nonetheless, the result is non-significant in the 
enforcement stage and in first instance cases in general. This small or non-existent effect of 
technology on court performance is similar to the results detailed in section 3. One possible 
explanation for this trend could be that expenses made in technology in one specific year have 
consequences just sometime later. Expenses with software, computers and IT infrastructure 
may take some years to reach the work done by judges and judicial staff. Other possible reason 
for the lack of relation between those variables is that technology may foster productivity, on 
the one hand, but it also increases access to courts and the facilitates the file of appeals on the 
other hand, which may cause court congestion. The net result of technology for court 
disposition time is dubious. 
Finally, the impact of expenses in capital resources on the number of resolved cases was 
null in all tested scenarios (judgement stage, enforcement stage and all cases), regardless of the 
method adopted (OLS or FE). This result confirms the general idea that the size of the budget 
has little or no relation with court output, as debated in section 3. It is important to emphasize 
that the variable tested was investment in capital, the only kind of budgetary expenses with 
some previous empirical evidence of effect on court performance (Buscaglia & Dakolias, 
1999). Nevertheless, even this carefully crafted variable tested in the present study seems to 
have no impact on court output. 
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5.5 Conclusions and Recommendations 
The main goal of the current study was to determine which factors affect the number 
of resolved cases in the judgment stage and in the enforcement stage of judicial proceedings 
on labor courts. Court output is only one of many judicial performance dimensions. The 
quality of judicial decision or the legitimacy that courts have in society are examples of 
dimensions that are not captured by the number of resolved cases. However, it is still a very 
important dimension. Those who bring disputes to court expect a judicial decision for their 
case, and the number of decisions taken by courts is directly connected to this expectancy. In 
fact, court users expected not just a judicial decision. They want an effective repair for the 
violation of their rights. In this sense, analysis of factors affecting the enforcement of judicial 
decisions are necessary. Despite the importance of the topic, a systematic understanding of 
which factors impact the enforcement of judicial decisions was still lacking. 
Distinguishing the judgement stage from the enforcement stage have shown to be a 
useful approach. Some explanatory variables have distinct impact depending on those stages. 
Perhaps the most visible difference relates to the impact of pending cases, whose impact on 
the number of resolved cases is much stronger in the enforcement stage than in the judgement 
stage. Investment on technology has shown small but significative effect on the judgment 
stage but not on the enforcement stage.  
Beyond filling a gap in the literature, this study challenges previous published studies 
on the same topic. On those studies, caseload was the dominant variable and the impact of the 
number of judges on the court output was low or null. Findings of the present study reveals 
that the impact of the number of judges is substantial and at least as high as the impact of 
caseload. Furthermore, the impact of new cases on the number of cases ended is slightly 
smaller than the impact found by previous studies. This point raises an important issue to the 
design of public policies involving courts. It suggests that policies designed to reduce the 
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number of cases may have a real effect on the size of case backlog and on court disposition 
time, as seems to be the case in Brazilian labor courts. This conclusion encourages policy 
makers and court administrators to explore the reduction of judicial demand as a possible 
solution to the problem of court congestion. 
In addition to investigate an under explored but important aspect of court performance 
(enforcement of judicial decisions) and to show findings that challenge the current knowledge 
about factors affecting court output, this research also contributes to the literature adding 
information about a Latin America continental country as Brazil, where factors affecting 
court performance may be different of the factors affecting comparatively smaller judicial 
systems. 
 Probably the main limitation of the present research was not applying an instrumental 
variables approach. The two-way fixed effect model used to run the regression analysis was 
able to solve some endogeneity issues, but not the reserve causality that would be addressed 
if instrumental variables were used. Future research on this theme may explore factors 







The main objective of this work was to investigate factors affecting court disposition time 
in Brazil. To comply with this objective, four studies were undertaken. Chapter 2 analyzed 
court disposition time blending four theoretical perspectives: institutional, organizational, 
agent-principal and game theory. Chapter 3 confirmed that court delay in Brazil is a real 
problem. The duration of civil cases in Brazil is almost three times higher than in Europe in the 
first instance and 50% higher than in Europe in the second instance. Chapter 4 explored which 
factors impact court disposition time in Brazil. After interviewees with judges, prosecutors, 
and lawyers, a list of 28 factors was clustered in three basic dimensions: institutional, 
jurisdictional, and organizational. Finally, Chapter 5 brought an empirical analysis of some 
organizational factors, exploring which factors impact the number of court decisions. 
Chapter 3 and 5 have one specific and important connection. Chapter 3 points that 
court disposition time in Brazil is higher than in European countries, but also shows that it 
has a decreasing tendency, because the clearance rate is above 100%, i.e., the number of 
cases decided is higher than the number of new filed cases. As a consequence, court backlog 
is reducing. However, the clearance rate in the enforcement phase is always lower than the 
clearance rate in the judgement stage, regardless of the type of court (state or labor) or the 
type of procedure (common or special). The clearance rate of enforcements is 100% for cases 
following special procedure and 94% for cases following common procedure, which means 
that the backlog of enforcements is stable or even increasing. As a consequence, court 
disposition time of those cases are increasing. For this reason, exploring factors that impact 
the number of enforcements is relevant. This is exactly the focus of Chapter 5, which found 
that variations in the number of new filed enforcements, the number of pending enforcements 




Chapter 2 and 4 are strongly interrelated. The theoretical perspectives debated in the 
former may be applied to analyze the factors affecting court disposition time listed in the 
later. Those factors are closely connected to the thesis of this work. The thesis has a 
mathematical inspiration: time is equal to distance upon speed. The factors listed in Chapter 4 
may be connected to the procedural distance, to the speed of proceedings or to both. This 
framework of analysis is shown in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1 
Framework of Analysis 
 
 
The principal-agent theory may be used to explain the behavior of judges and lawyers. 
The self-interest of judges is the underlying explanation to many jurisdictional factors listed 
in Chapter 4, as the procrastination in deciding complex and polemic cases, which are time-
consuming. This judicial behavior reduces court speed. The self-interest of lawyers also may 
be explained by the principal-agent theory. The culture of litigation and the culture of non-
conformity may reflect self-interested lawyers, which have economic incentives to initiate 
and insist on judicial litigation even when this is not the best option for the parties they 
represent. On the one hand, the behavior of lawyers increases court congestion, reducing 
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court speed. On the other hand, it makes the procedural journey longer, increasing procedural 
distance. 
Game theory debated the behavior of litigants, notably the behavior of repeated 
players. Repeated players are usually rational and their behavior may be a consequence of the 
institutional arena in which they play. One of the main institutional features of the litigation 
arena in Brazil is the low deterrence debated in Chapter 4. The lack of punitive damages in 
Brazil seems to work as an incentive for repeated players insisting on misbehavior. As a 
consequence, many cases are brought to courts, causing court congestion and reducing court 
speed. 
It is evident that the organizational theory offers an appropriate background to analyze 
organizational factors. Courts are organizations and the way organizational resources are used 
may be crucial to court disposition time. Surprisingly, organizational resources seem to be 
well managed by courts. The pivotal role played by the Brazilian National Council of Justice 
should be stressed. The council has defined performance indicators and performance targets 
for courts, and promoted the development of an advanced software for the management of 
judicial activities. Those initiatives fostered the classic administrative functions of planning, 
organization and control among courts. It is worth noting that Brazilian courts usually have 
enough human and financial resources. Except for specific state courts, it seems that the 
quantity and the quality of judges and judicial staff are not a problem. The financial needs of 
the judicial system represent a significant part of public budget and courts have high degree 
of autonomy to administer their budgets. In other words, organizational factors seem to 
contribute to faster resolution of cases, increasing the speed of courts. 
The institutional theory has a strong relation with institutional factors and those 
institutional factors have a strong relation with both procedural distance and the speed of 
proceedings. Most institutional factors debated in Chapter 4 may be analyzed through 
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institutional lenses. Special attention should be paid to the legal system. The legal system is 
the most important legal institution in any country. Besides being formal and enforceable by 
definition, laws regulate the most important aspects of court performance, as access to courts, 
hearings, procedures, judgements, juries, and appeals. 
The historical institutionalism and its concept of path dependence seem to provide a 
broad theoretical explanation to court delay in Brazil. Brazilian procedural code has an Italian 
origin and this fact seem to be decisive to explain some factors clustered in the legal 
category, as the number of appeals, the enforcement as a second case and the lack of private 
discovery. It seems not to be a coincidence that Brazil and Italy have high court disposition 
time. As shown in Chapter 3, both countries are ranked in the last positions when compared 
to European countries. In a ranking of court disposition time in first instance courts, while 
Italy is ranked in the 38th position (514 days), Brazil is ranked the 40th position (600 days).  
Legal factors have a strong impact on the speed of court proceedings. Brazilian laws 
seem to promote court congestion. As many cases are brought to court, the speed of court 
proceedings is low. Disputes between private parties are a fact of life. Due to the public costs 
involved in the use of courts are high, legal systems around the world are designed to 
stimulate the direct resolution of conflict between parties. The use of courts should be the last 
option. Actually, solving conflicts without a judicial decision should be the way or at least the 
better way to healthy social relations in democratic societies and with a high stage of 
development in a civilizing process. However, Brazilian legal system seems to be designed to 
promote judicial litigation. Judicial litigation occurs when the minimum amount that the 
plaintiff would accept as a settlement (expected gain from trial, net of litigation costs) is 
higher than the maximum amount that the defendant would pay. In this situation, there is no 




First, there are no institutional incentives for information sharing before cases are 
brought to courts. All discovery and disclosure procedures – as interrogatories or depositions 
- are reserved to public judges and depend on the use of courts. Parties are forced to use the 
judicial system to obtain information from the other side. Without information from the other 
side, parties keep their natural optimism about the result of the judgement and decide to 
litigate in court. 
Second, litigation costs are low. Even after information sharing, some divergence 
between parties about judgement is natural. An additional incentive must be created to 
encourage direct resolution of private disputes. The typical economic incentive is the cost of 
judicialization. When the divergence is low and the cost is high, parties will prefer to resolve 
their disputes privately, in order to avoid litigation costs. However, litigation costs in Brazil 
are so low that are unable to avoid litigation even when divergence between parties is 
negligible. In fact, litigation costs are zero in many situations. Many procedures are free ex 
lege, i.e., they are free due to a legal mandate, regardless of the plaintiff’s income. Even 
wealthy citizens and companies use the judicial system with no cost. If there is no cost and no 
risk, judicial litigation represents just possible economic benefits to the plaintiff, a perfect 
scenario not just for the plaintiffs, but also for the excessive number of lawyers in the 
country. 
Besides those problems, another legal factor contributes to the congestion of Brazilian 
courts: the enforcement of tax cases, which represented 20% of new filed cases and almost 
40% of pending cases in 2019 (CNJ, 2020). Those cases are filed by tax agencies that try to 
force debtors to pay tax debts. As tax authorities lack the powers to conduct patrimonial 
constrictions directly, they are forced to use judicial services to collect tax debts, increasing 
court congestion and delay. Tax authorities in other countries and other administrative 
authorities in Brazil have powers to promote patrimonial constriction. Extending this 
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Source: created by the author using data from CNJ (2020) and STF (2020). 
possibility to Brazilian tax authorities would have a substantial effect on the reduction of 
court congestion.  
Legal factors have a strong impact on procedural distance. As the distance of the 
procedural road is too long, cases take too much time to be resolved. The most notable and 
publicly debated factor about the length of judicial proceedings is the number of instances in 
Brazil. Brazilian judicial system has four instances. Any case may reach Brazilian Supreme 
Court, including small claims. Moreover, cases reach upper courts and come back to the first 
instance multiple times. Preliminary decisions, main decisions and enforcement decisions 
may be appealed in innumerable occasions. Multiple instances may be accessed several times 
along the case. Brazilian procedural rode is not straight. As a consequence, lawsuits do not 
follow a straight line and seem to run around circles within the judicial system. Brazilian 
procedural system is a long and winding road. 
There is an intense debate in Brazil about the idea of resolving cases in the second 
instance, eliminating the time spent in the third and fourth instances. Whereas this may be 
considered a rational step to shorten the length of cases in the country, it should be clear that 
just a small part of cases is concentrated in those instances. Among the 77 million cases 
pending of resolution in Brazilian courts in 2019, less than 1 million were in the third and 
fourth instances (CNJ, 2020), as shown in Figure 6.2: 
Figure 6.2 7 








The most important focus of court reform in Brazil should be the first instance, which 
concentrates 92% of pending cases in Brazil. Moreover, court disposition time in the first 
instance is higher than in other instances and three times higher than in Europe, showing that 
this instance has great potential to be improved. However, the solution of simply “eliminating” 
the instance, as proposed to the third and to the fourth instances, is not feasible in relation to 
the first instance. As cases start in the first instance, it cannot be avoided. So, how to reduce 
the time spent in the first instance? 
The essential improvement seems to be eliminating or at least drastically reducing 
obligations that go beyond the classic jurisdictional functions. Judicial obligations in the first 
instance range from writing down petitions (in Small Claims Courts) to locating debtor’s 
assets during enforcement proceedings. Nevertheless, no obligation seems to be more 
harmful to case disposition time than the judicial collection of evidence (discovery). 
Evidence should be collected by the parties, as in the United States, where lawyers have 
powers to requisition documents, submit questions that the other side must answer before the 
trial begins and interview the other side's witnesses under oath (Cooter & Rubinfeld, 1994). 
As parties are required to collect evidence before bringing the case to the court, procedural 
steps to collect evidence during the trial are reduced or even eliminated, decreasing the 
duration of cases. In other words, the collection of evidence should be conducted privately, 
before case, and not by the judge, during the case.  
Besides reducing the length of procedural road in the first instance, private discovery 
would also reduce the number of cases brought to courts. There is no reason to believe that 
the number of disputes that arise society in Brazil should be higher than in the United States. 
The difference is that in the United States parties collect evidence before the case, reducing 
asymmetry of information between opposite sides, which reduces natural optimism and 
increases the chances of settlement. In addition to that, parties are stimulated to make private 
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settlements before judicialization to avoid litigation costs. As a consequence, a small part of 
private disputes is judicialized (Spier, 2005). In Brazil, the first step is the judicialization. As 
debated above, parties do not have powers to collect evidence and are forced to file a suit. 
Right after judicialization, and before the collection of evidence, courts try to foster 
settlement between parties. However, at this stage, parties are still optimistic, and the chances 
of settlement are low. Figure 6.3 compare the situation in Brazil and in the United States: 
Figure 6.3 8 














The number of lawyers was appointed by interviewees of this research as part of the 
problem. However, they may be part of the solution. Brazil has 1.1 million lawyers (OAB, 
2020) and just 18 000 judges (CNJ, 2020). As disputes will continue to arise, it is evident that 
they should be firstly filtered by lawyers. If Brazilian lawyers had powers to help their clients 
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to collect evidence and conduct discovery, parties would have access to more information 
before judicial litigation. The reduction in information asymmetry between both sides would 
make parties more realistic about the judgments, increasing the chances of private settlements 
before judicialization. 
Due to legal factors, Brazilian procedural distance is long also during the enforcement 
stage, the last part of a case. Several procedures are necessary to enforce judicial decisions 
because legal protections of debtor’s assets are rampant. According to Brazilian Civil 
Procedure Code, savings accounts may not be frozen up to a limit, salaries cannot be 
constricted, family properties are protected by law and even TV screens and computers are 
considered “family” assets. All those protections work as barriers embarrassing the collection 
of the debt and postponing the resolution of cases. 
A panoramic conclusion of the research may be that court disposition time is a 
complex phenomenon associated with the design of the entire legal system. Factors affecting 
court delay are multiple ones. One way to describe the problem is using an image. Brazilian 
judicial system may be described as a long and congested road, where the cases run around in 
circles. This thesis proposes that court delay in Brazil is a consequence of long procedural 
distances and low speed of proceedings. 
The rationalization of judicial procedures and the reduction of court demand require 
legal reforms. Brazilian legal reforms implemented during the first two decades of the 
twentieth century represented important steps to improve judicial performance but were not 
enough to address the problem of court delay in Brazil. More sophisticated legal reforms are 
necessary. The analysis made in this doctoral dissertation contributes to the design of 
carefully crafted legal reforms. 
There is a huge space for future research about factors affecting court disposition time 
in Brazil. Some of the reasons debated along this work may be empirically explored. One 
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possibility is investigating if court demand in Brazil is higher than in other countries, for 
instance, verifying the level of internal selectivity of cases along the instances. For example, 
the proportion of cases appealed from the first to the second instances in Brazil may be higher 
or lower than in other countries. This work has shown that increasing the number of judges 
may have a relevant impact on the number of decided cases. However, considering that the 
budget of Brazilian Judicial System is already large, it seems relevant to contrast the number 
of judges per inhabitant in Brazil and in other judicial systems, aiming to understand if the 
quantity of judges here is appropriate or not. 
One interesting and under explored research avenue seems to be scrutinizing the effect 
of legal reforms in Brazil. For example, the Brazilian Civil Procedural Code was 
reformulated in 2015. It is possible that some effects of the code on the performance of courts 
may be empirically tested. Finally, it should be said that knowledge about the performance of 
criminal courts is scarce. All the essays debated in this doctoral dissertation focused on non-
criminal cases. Considering that legal actors, courts and procedural rules related to non-
criminal cases are significantly different from those related to criminal cases, investigations 





Associação dos Magistrados Brasileiros. (2019). Estudo da imagem do judiciário brasileiro. 
Fundação Getúlio Vargas. https://www.amb.com.br/wp-
content/uploads/2020/04/ESTUDO_DA_IMAGEM_.pdf 
Arake, H., & Gico Jr., I. (2014). De graça, até injeção na testa: Análise juseconômica da 
gratuidade de Justiça. Economic Analysis of Law Review, 5(1), 166–178.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.18836/2178-0587/ealr.v5n1p166-178 
Aumman, R., Maschler, M., & Stearns, R. (1995). Repeated games with incomplete 
information. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Bar-Gill, O. (2005). The evolution and persistence of optimism in litigation. The Journal of 
Law, Economics, & Organization, 22(2), 490—507. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4152844 
Bardin, L. (2011). Análise de conteúdo. Edições 70 (4th ed.). 
Barroso, L. (2016). Trabalhando com uma nova lógica: A ascensão dos precedentes no 
Direito brasileiro. Revista da Advocacia-Geral da União, 15(3), 9–52. 
Beenstock, M., & Haitovsky, Y. (2004). Does the appointment of judges increase the output 
of the judiciary? International Review of Law and Economics, 24(3), 351–369.  
https://10.1016/j.irle.2004.10.006 
Berlemann, M., & Cristmann, R. (2020). Disposition time and the utilization of prior judicial 
decisions: Evidence from a Civil Law Country. International Review of Law and 
Economics, 62. Article 105887. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2020.105887 
Bielen, S., Marneffe, W., Grajzl, P., & Dimitrova-Grajzl, V. (2016). The duration of judicial 
deliberation: Evidence from Belgium. Working Paper No. 5947. Center for Economic 
Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo).  
111 
 
Bielen, S., Marneffe, W., & Vereeck, L. (2015). A cross-country analysis of the impact of 
regulatory quality on commercial case disposition time. European Journal of Law and 
Economics, 39(3), 455–474. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-014-9469-5 
Bielen, S., Peters, L., Marneffe, W., & Vereeck, L. (2018). Backlogs and litigation rates: 
Testing congestion equilibrium across European judiciaries. International Review of 
Law and Economics, 53, 9–22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2017.09.002 
Boehm, J., & Ezra, O. (2018). Misallocation in the market for inputs: Enforcement and the 
organization of production. Working paper 24937. National Bureau of Economic 
Research. 
Buonanno, P., & Galizzi, M. M. (2014). Advocatus, et non Latro? Testing the Excess of 
Litigation in the Italian Courts of Justice. Review of Law & Economics, 10(3), 285–
322. https://doi.org/10.1515/rle-2014-0022 
Buscaglia, E., & Dakolias, M. (1999). Comparative international study of court performance 
indicators. The World Bank. 
http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/373641468769467659/pdf/multi-
page.pdf 
Buscaglia, E., & Ulen, T. (1997). A quantitative assessment of the efficiency of the judicial 
sector in Latin America. International Review of Law and Economics, 17(2), 275–
291. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00007-0 
Castelar, A. (2009). Judiciário e economia no Brasil. Centro Edelstein de Pesquisas Sociais. 
Castro, A. (2009). Court performance in Brazil: Evidence from judicature-level data. SSRN 
Electronic Journal (April 2016). https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2612941 
Commission Européenne Pour L‘efficacité de la Justice. (2017). Explanatory Note to the 





Commission Européenne Pour L‘efficacité de la Justice. (2018). European judicial systems 
(Data 2016). Efficiency and quality of justice. CEPEJ Studies nº 26. Council of 
Europe publishing. https://rm.coe.int/rapport-avec-couv-18-09-2018-en/16808def9c 
Chemin, M. (2009). Do judiciaries matter for development? Evidence from India. Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 3(2), 230–250. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2009.02.001 
Chemin, M. (2010). Does court speed shape economic activity? Evidence from a court reform 
in India. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 28(3), 460—485. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41653646 
Choi, S., Gulati, M., & Posner, E. (2007). Professionals or politicians: The uncertain 
empirical case for an elected rather than appointed judiciary. Working paper No. 357 
(2nd series). John M. Olin Law & Economics. http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1008989 
Clarck, D., & Merryman, J. (1976). Measuring the duration of judicial and administrative 
proceedings. Michigan Law Review, 75(1), 89–99. 
https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol75/iss1/5 
Conselho Nacional de Justiça. (2019). Relatório Anual da Ouvidoria 2018. Conselho 
Nacional de Justiça. https://www.justica.gov.br/ouvidoria/relatorio-de-ouvidoria-
2018.pdf 




Conselho Nacional de Justiça. (2020). Relatório Justiça em Números 2020: Ano-base 2019. 





Cooter, R., & Rubinfeld, D. (1994). An economic model of legal discovery. The Journal of 
Legal Studies, 23(1), 435–463. http://www.jstor.org/stable/724329 
Coviello, D., Moretti, L., Spagnolo, G., & Valbonesi, P. (2013). Court Efficiency and 
Procurement Performance. Working Paper n.164. Università Degli Studi Di Padova, 
Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche “Marco Fanno.” 
https://www.siecon.org/sites/siecon.org/files/oldfiles/uploads/2013/09/Coviello-
Moretti-Spagnolo-Valbonesi.pdf 
Dakolias, M. (1999). Court performance around the world: A comparative perspective. Yale 
Human Rights and Development Journal, 2(1), 87–142. 
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj/vol2/iss1/2 
Dalton, T., & Singer, J. (2009). A matter of size: An analysis of court efficiency using 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling. New England Law. Boston Research Paper No. 13–14. 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1133242 
Da Ros, L. (2015). O custo da Justiça no Brasil: Uma análise comparativa exploratória. 
Observatório de elites políticas e sociais do Brasil, 2(9). http://observatory-
elites.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/newsletter-Observatorio-v.-2-n.-9.pdf 
Deyneli, F. (2012). Analysis of relationship between efficiency of justice services and salaries 
of judges with two-stage DEA method. European Journal of Law and Economics, 34, 
477–493. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-011-9258-3 
DiMaggio, P., & Powell, W. (1983). The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and 




Dimitrova-Grajzl, V., Grajzl, P., Slavov, A., & Zajc, K. (2016). Courts in a transition 
economy: Case disposition and the quantity-quality tradeoff in Bulgaria. Economic 
Systems, 40(1), 18–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecosys.2015.09.002 
Dimitrova-Grajzl, V., Grajzl, P., Sustersic, J., & Zajc, K. (2012). Judicial incentives and 
performance at lower courts: Evidence from Slovenian judge-level data. International 
Review of Law and Economics, 32(1), 19–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2011.12.006 
Dixit, A. (1998). The Making of Economic Policy: A Transaction-Cost Politics Perspective. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. The MIT Press.  
Dixit, A. (2002). Incentives and organizations in the public sector: An interpretative review. 
The Journal of Human Resources, 37(4), 696–727. https://doi.org/10.2307/3069614 
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2003). Courts: The Lex 
Mundi Project. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2), 453–517. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/003355303321675437 
European Court of Human Rights. (2019). Guide on Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. https://www.echr.coe.int/documents/guide_art_6_eng.pdf 
Engelbreckt, A. (2010). Institutional Theories, EU Law and the Role of the Courts for 
Developing a European Social Model. In Neergaard et al. (Eds.), The role of courts in 
developing a European social model: Theoretical and methodological perspectives, 
(pp. 299–351). Djøf Publishing.  
Epstein, L., Landes, W. M.; & Posner, R. A. (2010). Why (and when) judges dissent: 
Theoretical and empirical analysis. Working Paper N. 510. John M. Olin Program in 
Law and Economics. https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics/626/ 
Fix-Fierro, H. (2003). Courts, justice and efficiency: A socio-legal study of economic 
rationality in adjucation. Hart Publishing,  
115 
 
Fundação Getúlio Vargas. (2017). Relatório com os dados da pesquisa Índice de Confiança 
na Justiça (ICJBrasil) referente ao 1º semestre de 2017. Fundação Getúlio Vargas. 
http://hdl.handle.net/10438/19034 
Galanter, M. (1974). Why the "haves" come out ahead: Speculations on the limits of legal 
change. Law and society review, 9(1), 95–160. https://doi.org/10.2307/3053023 
Garoupa, N., & Ginsburg, T. (2009). Guarding the guardians: Judicial councils and judicial 
independence. The American Journal of Comparative Law, 57(1), 103–134. 
https://doi.org/10.5131/ajcl.2008.0004 
Gibbons, R. (1997). An introduction to applicable Game Theory. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 11(1), 127–149. http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0895-
3309%28199724%2911%3A1%3C127%3AAITAGT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-D 
Gico, Jr. (2014). A Tragédia do judiciário. Revista de Direito Administrativo, 267, 163–198. 
https://doi.org/10.12660/rda.v267.2014.46462 
Gilson, R., & Mnookin, R. (1994). Disputing through agents: Cooperation and conflict 
between lawyers in litigation. Columbia Law Review, 94, 509–566. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/1123202 
Gomes, A., & Guimaraes, T. (2013). Desempenho no judiciário: Conceituação, estado da arte 
e agenda de pesquisa. Revista de Administração Pública., 47(2), 379–402. 
https://doi.org/10.1590/S0034-76122013000200005 
Gomes, A., Guimaraes, T., & Akutsu, L. (2016). The relationship between judicial staff and 
court performance: Evidence from Brazilian State Courts. International Journal for 
Court Administration, 8(1), 12–19. http://doi.org/10.18352/ijca.214 
Gomes, A., Guimaraes, T., & Akutsu, L. (2017). Court caseload management: The role of 




Gould, J. (1973). The Economics of Legal Conflicts. Journal of Legal Studies, 2(2), 279–300. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/i228980 
Guimaraes, T., Gomes, A., & Guarilho Filho, E. (2018). Administration of justice: An 
emerging research field. RAUSP Management Journal, 53(3), 476–482. 
https://doi.org/10.1108/RAUSP-04-2018-010 
Guimaraes, T., Odelius, C., Medeiros, J., & Santana, J. (2011). Management innovation at the 
Brazilian Superior Tribunal of Justice. The American Review of Public 
Administration, 41(3), 297–312. https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074010380449 
Grajzl, P., & Silwal, S. (2020). The functioning of courts in a developing economy: Evidence 
from Nepal. European Journal of Law and Economics, 49, 101–129. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-017-9570-7 
Grajzl, P., & Zajc, K. (2017). Litigation and the timing of settlement: Evidence from 
commercial disputes. European Journal of Law and Economics, 44, 287–319. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-016-9540-5 
Hall, P., & Taylor, R. (1996). Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms. Political 
Studies, XLIV, 936–957. https://doi.org/10.1111%2Fj.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x 
Hause, J. C. (1989). Indemnity, settlement, and litigation, or I’ll be suing you. Journal of 
Legal Studies, 18(1), 157–79. https://doi.org/10.1086/468144 
Hazra, A., & Micevska, M. (2004). The problem of court congestion: Evidence from Indian 
lower courts. ZEF – Discussion Papers on Development Policy, 88. Center for 
Development Research, University of Bonn. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21844 
Heise, M. L. (2000). Justice delayed? An empirical analysis of civil case disposition time. 




Holmstrom, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive 
contracts, asset ownership, and job design. Journal of Law, Economics, & 
Organization. 7(Special Issue), 24–52. https://www.jstor.org/stable/764957 
Huang, B. I. (2011). Lightened scrutiny. Harvard Law Review, 124(5), 1109–1152. 
https://harvardlawreview.org/2011/03/lightened-scrutiny/ 
Huang, P., & Wu, H. (1992). Emotional responses in litigation. International Review of Law 
and Economics, 12, 31–44. https://doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(92)90004-B 
Ippoliti, R., Melcarne, A., & Ramello, G. B. (2015). Judicial efficiency and entrepreneurs’ 
expectations on the reliability of European legal systems. European Journal of Law 
and Economics, 40, 75–94. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-014-9456-x 
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs 
and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X 
Jiang, Q. Y. (2005). Court delay and law enforcement in china: civil process and economic 
perspective. Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag. 
Kaplow, L., & Shavell, S. (2002). Economic Analysis of Law (pp. 1161–1784). In Handbook 
of Public Economics. ScienceDirect. 
Kondylis, F., & Stein, M. (2018). The Speed of Justice. Policy Research. Working Paper 
8372. World Bank. 
http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/fr/455021521720861143/pdf/The-speed-of-
justice.pdf 
Landes, W. (1971). An Economic Analysis of the Courts. Journal of Law and Economics, 
14(1), 61–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/466704 
Lorenzani, D., & Lucidi, F. (2014). The economic impact of civil justice reforms. European 
Economy. Economic Papers 530. http://dx.doi.org/10.2765/71090 
118 
 
March, J., & Olsen, J. (1984). The new institutionalism: Organizational factors in political 
life. The American Political Science Review, 78(3), 734–749. 
https://doi.org/10.1590/S0104-44782008000200010 
Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (2004). The politician and the judge: Accountability in government. 
The American Economic Review, 94(4), 1034–1054. 10.1257/0002828042002606 
Meyer, J., & Rowan, B. (1977). Formal structure as myth and ceremony. The American 
Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 340–363. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2778293 
Mintzberg, H. (1980). Structure in 5’s: A synthesis of the research on organizational design. 
Management Science, 26(3), 322–341. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.26.3.322 
Mitsopoulos, M., & Pelagidis, T. (2007). Does staffing affect the time to dispose cases in 
Greek courts? International Review of Law and Economics, 27(2), 219–244. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2007.06.001 
Mora-Sanguinetti, J. S., & Garoupa, N. (2015). Do lawyers induce litigation? Evidence from 
Spain, 2001–2010. International Review of Law and Economics, 44, 29–41. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2015.06.003 
Murrell, P. (2001). Demand and supply in Romanian commercial courts: Generating 
information for institutional reform. Journal of Economic Literature. Manuscript: 
IRIS Center. University of Maryland. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-016-9531-6 
North, D. (1993). Institutional change: A framework of analysis. In S. E. Sjöstrand (ed.), 
Institutional Change. Theory and Empirical Findings. M.E. Sharpe. 
Osborne, M., & Rubinstein, A. (1994). A Corse in Game Theory. Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press. 
P’ng. I. P. L. (1983). Strategic behavior in suit, settlement and trial. The Bell Journal of 
Economics, 14(2), 539–550. https://www.jstor.org/stable/i353458 
119 
 
Picker, R. (1994). An Introduction to Game Theory and the Law. Working Paper No. 22. 
Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics. University of Chicago Law School. 
https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics/50/ 
Polinsky, M., & Shavell, S. (1998). Punitive damages: An economic analysis. Harvard Law 
Review, 111(4), 869–962. https://doi.org/10.2307/1342009 
Posner, R. (1973). An economic approach to legal procedure and judicial administration. 
Journal of Legal Studies, 2(2), 399–458. https://www.jstor.org/stable/724058 
Posner, R. (1993). What do judges and justices maximize? (The same thing everybody else 
does). Supreme Court Economic Review, 3, 1–41. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/1147064 
Procopiuck, M. (2018). Information technology and time of judgment in specialized courts: 
What is the impact of changing from physical to electronic processing? Government 
Information Quarterly, 35(3), 491–501. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.giq.2018.03.005 
Reinganum, J. F., & Wilde, L. L. (1986). Settlement, litigation, and the alocation of legal 
costs. Rand Journal of Economics, 17(4), 557–566. https://doi.org/10.2307/2555481 
Rosales-López, V. (2008). Economics of court performance: an empirical analysis. European 
Journal of Law and Economics, 25, 231-251. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-008-
9047-9 
Salant, S., & Sims, T. (1996). Game Theory and the Law: Ready for prime time? Michigan 
Law Review, 94(6). https://doi.org/10.2307/1289973 
Shavell, S. (1982). Suit, settlement, and trial: A theoretical analysis under alternative methods 




Shavell, S. (1997). The fundamental divergence between the private and the social motive to 
use the legal system. Journal of Legal Studies, 26(S2), 575–612. 
https://doi.org/10.1086/468008 
Spier, K. (2005). Litigtaion (pp. 259–342). In Handbook of Law and Economics: Vol. 1. 
Elsevier. 




Tetley, W. (2000). Mixed jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codified and 
Uncodified).  Louisiana Law Review, 60(3), 677–738. 
https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol60/iss3/2 
Tribunal Superior do Trabalho. (2020). Valores pagos aos reclamantes nas varas do 
trabalho. Tribunal Superior do Trabalho. 
http://www.tst.jus.br/documents/18640430/cf0ee101-be3b-7ed0-635d-ad68c660319b 
Voigt, S. (2016). Determinants of judicial efficiency: A survey. European Journal of Law 
and Economics, 42(2-1), 183–208. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-016-9531-6 
Voigt, S., & El-Bialy, N. (2014). Identifying the determinants of aggregate judicial 
performance: Taxpayers’ money well spent? European Journal of Law and 
Economics, 41, 283–319. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-014-9474-8 
Weber, M. (1984). Economía y sociedad. Esbozo de sociología compreensiva (7th ed.). 






• Introduce yourself to the interviewee and inform that the research is related to a 
Doctoral Degree in Administration (UnB). 
• State the objective: describe which factors which factors affect court disposition time 
in Brazil. 
• Inform that there are no right or wrong answers. What matters is the interviewee’s 
perception. 
• Guarantee the anonymity of respondents: the answers will be analyzed in an aggregate 
way. 
• Ask permission to record the interview. 
• Inform that the interview will last approximately 30 minutes. 
Questions 
• In your view, which factors may have an influence, positive or negative, on court 
disposition time? 
• Do you notice any factors related to Brazilian cultural, social and legal conditions that 
affect court disposition time? 
• Which factors impact the time of enforcement proceedings? 
• How is your work controlled? Which people, departments or offices control your 
work from a quantitative and qualitative points of view? 
• In your view, which measures could be taken to reduce court disposition time? 




• We are reaching the end of our interview. Please feel free to report any fact or 
variable that, in your opinion, influences the length of court proceedings and the time 
for the enforcement of court decisions that were not covered in the previous questions. 
• Now some final questions about your profile, which will be used only to identify 
trends in responses (and never to identify survey participants). Which is your 
profession, age, position, length of service, and region of origin? 
